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ABSTRACT
GENERALIZATION OF THE EFFECTS OF REWARDS ON HIGH BASE-RATE BEHAVIORS
June 1978
Harold John Honebrink, B.A., St. Johns University
Ed. D. , University of Massachusetts
Directed by: Professor Peter Wagschal
Writers on education have remarked that the process of educa-
tion seems to have the unintended effect of causing a decline in
curiosity. Research has demonstrated that rewarding a high base-
rate behavior can subsequently have a negative effect on that behavior.
Since learning is construed as a high base-rate or intrinsically
motivated behavior, it is possible that a decline in learning might
be caused by the undermining effect of rewards on learning. The
research documented here does not deal directly with the relation-
ship between rewards and learning problems. This research attempts
to broaden the findings of other researchers on the effect of
rewards on high base-rate behavior while at the same time avoiding
some of the methodological weaknesses of their studies.
The concept of intrinsic motivation, upon which many of these
writers base their research, is examined in Chapter One. The
development of the intrinsic-extrinsic concept from its original
supposed role as a determiner of behavior to a more refined
approach which treats relative intrinsicity or extrinsicity as
perceptions having differential effects on the emission of behavior
is described. The concept that perceived locus of causality,
along a continuum from external to internal, affects a behavior's
persistence is introduced in Chapter One. Chapter Two reviews
research addressing the negative effects of rewards on behavior.
2Chapter Three describes a methodology for testing whether or not
the rewarding of some behaviors can have a negative effect on
the duration of other behaviors.
Two experiments which were performed for this paper are
reported on and discussed in Chapter Four. The experiments
support predictions of generalization of undermining effects to
behaviors other than target behaviors. In Experiment One, forty
nursery school students were divided into experimental and control
conditions. In the experimental conditions they were rewarded
for engaging in multiple high base-rate behaviors. In the
control conditions subjects were not rewarded. Duration of a
criterion activity which differed from the rewarded activities
was measured. Experiment Two was considered a replication of
Experiment One, but with one of the rewarded activities chosen
for its greater similarity to the criterion activity.
In Chapter Five, bahavior modification literature findings
on generalization and maintenance of educational and treatment
effects are reviewed for evidence contradicting the findings of
research describing undermining effects. Methodological problems
with behavior modification research, as well as its focus on
low base-rate behaviors, prevent direct application of findings
to the undermining literature. Chapter Five analyzes implications
of the present research for token economies and for school learning
situations. Means for avoiding negative effects of reward
procedures are reviewed.
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Contingent rewards have traditionally been assumed to affect
behavior positively. Provision of reward is said to reinforce or
strengthen the behavior in question, i.e., increase the behavior's
frequency, quality, duration, etc. Reinforcement effects have
been documented extensively; many psychologists and educators
accept the use of reinforcement procedures uncritically. Little
experimental attention has been devoted to possible negative
consequences or side effects of reward procedures.
Whether the goal is to decrease undesirable behavior or to
teach an individual to read, an issue of prime import to an agent
seeking to effect a behavioral change is the resistance of that
behavior to extinction, i.e., its behavioral maintenance capability.
For example, we are concerned not only that an individual learns
to read in school, but also that the individual continues to read
after his schooling. Likewise, we are not only concerned that an
individual who received therapy for destructive behavior cease
the objectionable behavior while in therapy, but also that the
behavior does not reappear.
Effects of rewards on behavior . Until recently (Deci, 1971)
very little research involving the effects of rewards on behavior
had considered the deferred effects of the rewards on the
behavior
3
4in question, nor had it considered the effects of rewards on
other behavior. Analyzing the effects of rewards involves abstract-
ing certain events (rewards, behaviors) and principles (contin-
gencies, functions) from the stream of behavior (see Bandura,
1969, 1975). While this abstraction may serve an heuristic
function, other variables remain operative within the stream of
behavior, variables which do not become inoperative because we have
not abstracted them, variables of which it would be useful to be
cognizant. Assume that one rewards an individual for a behavior
he would perform "for its own sake" or without provision of reward,
and that the individual comes to feel that the provider of reward
is attempting to control his behavior through provision of reward.
The individual may show an increase in that targeted or abstracted
behavior either while still in the controlling situation, or later,
if certain features of the controlling situation remain salient to
him. But when those features of the controlling situation do not
serve to redintegrate the situation for him, he may no longer
perform the target behavior as often or as well as he did under
conditions of reward, or as much as he did before reward.
If we are in a position where we have measured an increase in
the target behavior while the individual is still expecting reward,
we would conclude that by rewarding the behavior in question we
had increased its duration, frequency or quality. However, the
individual may have responded to our experimental reward not only
with an instrumental increase in the behavior while the cues were
operative, but also with a cognition to the effect that we were
/
5attempting to control his behavior. Specifically he might have
concluded that the behavior we were attempting to foster could
not have been worth doing for its own sake or we would not have
had to reward him to do it (Lepper, Greene, and Nisbett, 1973).
The individual may react against our attempts at control in
an attempt to restore his perceived loss of freedom (Brehm, 1966).
He may not perform the behavior in the future as long, as well,
or at all as a result of his cognition that it must not be worth
doing. If we were to measure the targeted behavior at some time
in the future, would we conclude that our reward procedure had
caused the activity to decrease in duration, frequency, and/or
qual ity?
Finally, what would be the deferred effect if we were to
reward a whole class of behavior (for example, learning behavior)
such that the individual perceived that we were attempting to
control all learning behavior, or that all learning behavior was
not worth doing for its own sake? The negative effect of reward
would generalize. When our reward procedures had ceased operating,
we would expect that other, unrewarded learning behaviors would
decrease in duration. We would have succeeded in producing an
iatrogenic learning disorder.
A student of behavior would profit from awareness of effects
of reward on behavior other than those readily observable in the
rewarding situation. He would profit as well from an awareness
of any particular conditions under which those deferred, inconspic-
uous, or not immediately discernible effects occur. We must
6examine the effects of our procedures on our longterm goals as
well as the concomitant or attendant effects (Levine & Fasnacht,
1975, 1976; Feingold & Mahoney, 1975; Winett & Winkler, 1972).
The particular question this dissertation will probe is this:
what is the deferred effect of tangibly rewarding high base-rate
behaviors on the duration of a similar behavior?
Implications of research
. The deferred effects mentioned above
are relevant to the behavior modification literature as well
as to typical classroom reward procedures such as gold stars or
grades. Token economies, a behavior modification procedure, are
widely used in classrooms. Reward systems are introduced upon
entrance to school programs or token programs with very little
documentary evidence as to the long-term effects of the procedures
or the efficacy of the system in these situations (Stuart, 1972).
Holt (1964) and Silberman (1970) recognize a decline in
curiosity which they see as a result of schooling. If rewards
have a deleterious effect on high base-rate behavior, and if
learning, as a high base-rate behavior (Jung, 1968) is rewarded,
we would expect that rewards will have a deleterious effect on
learning.
O'Leary and Drabman (1971) and Levine and Fasnacht (1975)
call for data on generalization following removal of token programs.
Because of research documenting the potentially counter-productive
effects of rewarding high base-rate behaviors, closer scrutiny
should be paid to the efficacy of the programs. If a great
7potential for harm exists, with little potential for gain, serious
question should be given the wisdom of maintaining these programs
in their present form. Conversely, if no potential for harm exists,
any gain through the use of reward procedures would make the
programs and procedures worthwhile.
In either case, an examination of methods is necessary to
avoid problems related to undermining effects. Skinner (1971)
acknowledges the possibility of harm when he states, "Genuine
reinforcers can be used in ways which have aversive consequences"
(p. 34) and "conditioned positive reinforcers can often be used
with deferred aversive results" (p. 33).
Levine and Fasnacht (1975) fault the behavior modification
literature for not containing qualifications as to its utility,
viz., that it has potential for harm. In an earlier article,
Levine and Fasnacht (1974) note that attention must be paid to the
process of removing reinforcers, and that "removal of reinforcers
constitutes an extinction paradigm, not a generalization paradigm"
(p. 819).
Feingold and Mahoney (1976) identify problems with shotgun
approaches to behavior modification:
One very relevant concern in the wholesale adoption of
token economy procedures in schools has to do with their
effects on children's academic interests. When struc-
tured reward conteingencies are applied to an entire
classroom, it is unlikely that every single child in the
class was exhibiting pre-program deficiencies inacademic
or social performance. This raises the possibility that
some children will begin receiving extrinsic rewards for
behaviors which they had previously engaged in without
supplementary incentives, (pp. 367-368) (c.f. Winett &
Winkler, 1972)
8Since research documenting decrement in high base-rate
behavior following reward exists, the potential for harm exists.
Feingold and Mahoney (1976) question the goals of token programs,
Given the occasional adoption of restrictive, discipline relevant
goals (Winett and Winkler, 1972) and the concomitant de-emphasis
of personal, social and educational factors (Silberman, 1970), it
seems unlikely that all classroom token procedures are free of
negative effects" (p. 376).
Rewards have been shown to negatively affect high base-rate
behaviors, behaviors many writers characterize as intrinsically
motivated. A discussion of the concept of intrinsic motivation
follows.
Intrinsic Motivation
. A major point of this paper revolves around
evidence that the particular motivator, stimulus to action, or
inducement for an activity differentially affects subsequent
performance of that activity and similar activities. One way of
classifying stimuli to action or motivation is whether the partic-
ular causes are intrinsic or extrinsic in nature. Investigators
of varying backgrounds, studying motivation for activity or
causal factors relating to activity, have sometimes drawn a
distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic factors. Lepper and
Greene (1976) state:
Among experimental social psychologists the distinction
between internally and externally governed behavior has
long been regarded as fundamental. Whether cast in terms
of 'internalization' vs. 'compliance' (Kelman, (1958),
'private' vs. 'public' behavior (Asch, 1948; Collins,
1973), 'intrinsic' vs. 'extrinsic' motivation (deCharms,
91968), or 'internal' vs. 'external' control (Bern, 1972),
a conceptual line has been drawn between behavior
which appears to be a function of clear and powerful
environmental contingencies and behavior which occurs
in the seeming absence of salient external contingencies"
(p. 25).
Ross (1975) describes behavior as intrinsically motivated if
a person "performs an activity 'for its own sake' and extrinsically
motivated if the activity is performed as a means to an end, that
is, to obtain a reward or avoid a punishment" (p. 245). Calder
and Staw (1975b, p. 599) quote Young (1961):
If a situation contains a specific goal which provides
satisfaction independent of the actual activity itself,
behavior is said to be extrinsically motivated. On the
other hand, if the activity is valued for its own sake,
and appears to be self-sustained, behavior is said to be
intrinsically motivated, (p. 171).
Staw (1976) explains that "whereas extrinsic motivation emphasizes
the value an individual places on the ends of an action and the
probability of reaching those ends, intrinsic motivation refers to
the pleasure or value associated with the activity itself" (p. 2).
Berlyne (1971) asserts that intrinsically motivated behaviors are
those behaviors aimed at establishing certain internal conditions
that are rewarding for the organism; a person will behave so as to
maintain an optimal level of stimulation. Deci (1975) defines
intrinsically motivated behaviors as,
behaviors which a person engages in to feel competent
and self-determining. . .Intrinsically motivated behaviors
will be of two general kinds. When there is no stimula-
tion people will seek it. A person who gets no stimulation
will not feel competent and self-determining. . .so he seeks
out... ways in which to feel competent and self-determining
...The other general kind of intrinsically motivated
behavior involves conquering challenges or reducing
incongruity. Only when a person is oble to reduce
incongruity
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(or reduce dissonance) .. . wi 1 1 he feel competent and
self-determining.
. .He will feel satisfied when he is
able to seek out pleasureable stimulation and deal
effectively with over-stimulation.
. .seeking and
conquering challenges which are optimal for him.
(pp. 61-62)
Earlier, Deci (1971, 1972a, 1972b) distinguished between
extrinsic and intrinsic motivation on the basis of whether the
individual located the causality for an activity within himself
or whether he located it in the external evironment. Kruglanski
(1975b) points out some conceptual difficulties:
Any activity seems to have an internal cause, the
actor's motive for engaging in it, and b) many
activities seem to have both an external cause and
an internal one, namely the anticipated change in the
environment (reception of the reward, solution of the
problem) satisfying the actor's motive for engaging
in the activity, (p. 744)
Kruglanski attempts to avoid such problems by basing the distinction
between intrinsic and extrinsic motivation on whether the person's
self-attributed cause for an activity lies in its content or its
consequence. He states that this distinction is on a strictly
attributional level, irrespective of the actual motives satisfiable
within the content or consequence of the activity.
Staw (1976), in an attempt to amend expectancy by value
theories of motivation to include intrinsic factors, lists working
on a task for the activity and stimulation involved and also for
satisfaction at accomplishment; the former regardless of accom-
plishment or tangible rewards and the latter regardless of
external rewards. He lists three sources of value for
task
performance: 1) value associated with a behavior itself, 2)
value
11
associated with accomplishment, and 3) value associated with rewards
presented by others. Staw claims the first two sources of value
are intrinsic, since they are mediated by the individual, and that
the third is extrinsic. However, if we were to apply another
definition of intrinsic motivation to the three sources of value,
namely Ross' 1975 distinction based on whether the activity is
performed for its own sake or as a means to an end, we see that
performing an activity for the sense of accomplishment is performing
the activity as a means to an end, i.e., accomplishment. Thus,
depending on the definition, values one and two are intrinsic
and three extrinsic, or, values two and three are extrinsic and one
is the intrinsic value.
Operational definition of intrinsic motivation . Reiss and Sushinsky
(1975) identify problems with the operational definition of
intrinsic motivation employed by Lepper and his associates:
Under the operational definition of intrinsic motivation
employed in the Lepper et al . studies— percentage of
time a subject chose to engage in an activity-all
behaviors are intrinsical ly motivated. .. intrinsic motiva-
tion is defined as a property of a situation rather than
as a property of behavior, thus drawing will appear
intrinsically motivating under one set of alternatives,
but not under others. (See also Reiss and Sushinsky,
1976). (p. 1124)
Reiss and Sushinsky attack the concept of intrinsic motivation
for its vagueness.
The concept of intrinsic motivation demands operational
definition. The vagueness inherent in this concept is
clearly evident in the Lepper et al . (1973; Note 1)
studies in which control students were asked to draw _
because an experimenter was interested in viewing their
drawing. The investigators considered drawing elicited
in this request, even when accompanied by coaxing,
12
drawing under conditions of 'intrinsic' motivation,
that is, under conditions which do not cause re-attri-
bution of drawing to external factors... it could be
maintained that the promised reward procedures elicited
intrinsic motivation (mastery--the attainment of which
was symbolized by the reward), the control procedures
elicited extrinsic motivation (compliance). Thus the
concept of intrinsic motivation is so vague that its
presence or absence can be inferred arbitrarily, depend-
ing on the investigator's theoretical bias. (p. 1124)
Intrinsic motivation as a case of secondary reinforcement
. Cofer
and Appley (1967) criticize the account of behavior in terms of
intrinsic and extrinsic motivation. They state that the process
is merely described and not explained and that other theories
might plausibly explain the phenomenon, notably secondary reinforce-
ment. Secondary reinforcement refers to a process by which an
originally neutral stimulus acquires reinforcing properties through
its association with a primary reinforcer. In these terms, an
intrinsically motivated activity is simply one in which the rein-
forcement value of the goal has associatively rubbed off on the
behavior itself (Calder and Staw, 1975). Problems arise in turn
with an explanation of the phenomenon in terms of secondary
reinforcement.
A secondary reinforcement criticism implies concomitant
de-emphasis of cognitive factors. Jung (1968) portrays verbal
learning as a combination of associative and cognitive aspects.
Bandura (1974) states that:
Behavior is not much affected by its consequences with-
out awareness of what is being reinforced (Bandura, 1969,
Dunlay, 1968). After individuals discern the instru-
mental relationship between action and outcome, contingent
rewards may produce accomodating or oppositional behavior
depending on how they value the incentives, the influences,
the behavior itself, and how others respond, (p. 860)
13
Bandura sees reinforcement as changing "from a mechanical strength-
ening of conduct to an informative and motivating influence."
Feingold and Mahoney (1975) state, "The pervasive influence of
cognitive processes in human performance can hardly be overlooked"
(p. 368), (see also Mahoney, 1974) and "the potential importance
of attribution in personal motivation merits further examination"
(p. 368).
White (1959) portrays interaction with the environment as an
independent human motive, a motive observed so strongly and so early
that it precludes description in reinforcement terms. White
recounts at length Piaget's 1952 description of his son Laurent's
interaction with a rattle, observing that the child uses nearly
the whole repertoire of psychological processes (except those
accompanying stress) i.e., sensing
,
perceiving, attending, learning,
recognizing, recalling, thinking and pleasant affect. He states
that this behavior is selective, directed, persistent, in short,
motivated toward power, control, or primitive self-assertion.
White suggests that an overview of the situation is necessary to
understand the key to what transpires, an overview yielding a
picture of an individual discovering the effects he can have on
his environment and the effects the environment has on him. (See
also Bandura, 1975, p. 124). He calls this motivational aspect
of competence "effectance" (p. 321) and characterizes the experi-
ence produced as a feeling of efficacy (p. 326). White discusses
his concept of effectance in relation to primary and secondary
reinforcement and concludes that effectance is an independent
14
motive (See also DeCharms, 1968).
Perception of causality . Issues of whether one's behavior is
actually intrinsically or extrinsical ly motivated are avoided in
preference to the question of whether the individual sees his
behavior as intrinsically or extrinsical ly motivated. Relative
intrinsicity is seen as a perception on the part of the individual:
Does one attribute his behavior to intrinsic or extrinsic causes?
Does one perceive the locus of causality for his behavior as
internal or external? Implications for these questions will be
discussed later in the paper.
Bern (1968, 1972) and DeCharms (1968) represent behavioristic
and humanistic perspectives, respectively, on the individual's
acquisition of knowledge about his own behavior, viz., attribution
of causality for his behavior. DeCharms is cited in the work of
Calder and Staw (1975) and Deci (1971, 1972a, 1972b, 1973, 1975),
while Bern is cited in the work of Lepper and his associates, e.g.,
Lepper and Greene, 1973; Greene and Lepper, 1974; Lepper and
Greene, 1975; Amabile, DeJong, and Lepper, 1976. Bern is credited
as a reader of Deci's 1971 study. These writers study the negative
effects of rewards on behavior. For purposes of this research,
Bern's and DeCharms' positions are seen to differ primarily on
the origins of the perception of causality.
Bern's (1967, 1972) self perception theory asserts that
indivi-
duals acquire knowledge about their own internal states
by observ-
ing their own behavior and the circumstances in
which it occurs.
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DeCharms position begins with self-knowledge and asserts that
people make interpersonal attributions partly on the basis of
what they know about themselves, (c.f. Deci, 1975)
Bern (1965) sees origins of knowledge about ourselves as
based on perceptions of our own and others behavior:
An individual's belief and attitude statements and the
beliefs and attitudes that an outside observer would
attribute to him are 'inferences' from the same evidence;
the public events that the socializing community originally
' employed in training the individual to make such self-
descriptive statements, (p. 200)
Bern (1972) states: "a person will infer that he was intrin-
sically motivated to execute the induced behavior to the extent
that external contingencies of reinforcement appeared to be
absent" (p. 39). We see Bern viewing intrinsic motivation as a
perception on the part of the individual, one he has inferred
from cues in the situation, cues which are external to him.
DeCharms (1968) states that, "What Bern has done... is to
demonstrate the fact that a person may be influenced in his infer-
ences about himself and others by observing his own or their
behavior" (p. 175). DeCharms makes this statement in reference
to Bern's research indicating that an external event (a colored
light) previously associated with telling the truth, can sub-
sequently influence a subject to justify his own statement that
is discrepant from his original belief by changing his belief
toward the discrepant statement.
DeCharms (1968) places emphasis of the origins of an indivi-
dual's knowledge about his behavior onto the individual's
internal
16
states:
In stressing the concept of personal causation, we are
not denying that we learn from our own and others
behavior, although we are giving priority to the
personal and ultimately private aspects of knowledge
about our feelings and motives, (p. 36)
DeCharms forcuses on where the person perceives the locus of
causality for his behavior:
Whenever a person experiences himself to be the locus
of causality for his own behavior (to be an Origin)
' he will consider himself to he intrinsically motivated.
Comversely, when a person perceives the locus of
causality for his behavior to be external to himself
(that he is a Pawn) he will consider himself to be
extrinsically motivated. We are suggesting that the
crux of the distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic
motivation may lie in the knowledge or feeling or
personal causation, (p. 328)
DeCharms relates the issue of perceived locus of causality of
that of control
:
If we assume, however, that a major factor in the intrinsic
dimension is the desire for personal causation, then
intrinsically motivating tasks are those in which the
person feels that he is in control, that he originated
the behavior (as an Origin) with the concomitant feelings
of free choice and commitment. Introduction of extrinsic
reward, however, places the person in a dependent position
relative to the source of the reward. To the extent that
the person expects a reward for his task, he is unfree
and has not chosen the task for its own sake alone. The
source of the reward is an external causal locus for his
behavior, (p. 329)
From the above we see that DeCharms interprets the individual's
perceived locus of causality for his behavior in relation to
questions of freedom and control. The individual's perceptions
of freedom or control are dependent on whether or not the individual
perceives the behavior of others as attempting to control him or
limit his freedom, or whether the individual feels a sense of
17
personal causation. On this basis, DeCharms predicts that intrinsic
motivation and extrinsic factors will interact, i.e., that addition
of extrinsic contingencies to an activity the individual finds
intrinsically interesting will be perceived as an attempt at
control or loss of freedom.
DeCharms sees another possible cause for decrement following
reward:
' The introduction of reward apparently affects the
subject's evaluation of the task itself. If the task
has been performed without reward and a reward is
introduced, the most obvious effect is for the subject
to attempt to attain the reward with the least effort
possibl e. . .One of the effects of an extrinsic reward
upon task behavior, then, is to focus attention on the
reward and this effect may produce a deterioration of
task performance, (p. 331)
De Charms here seems to indicate the nature of the negative
effect of rewards on behavior as both a result of cognitive
processes relating to locus of causality and also of interference
processes. An interference or competing response hypothesis
(Child and Waterhouse, 1952) is postulated by Reiss and Sushinsky
(1975) as a sufficient and necessary cause for what they term a
"decreased play effect." More attention is devoted to this
concept in Chapter 2.
Origins of self-perception and attribution theory . Heider (1958)
is cited in both the work of Bern and of DeCharms. DeCharms notes
as, "the second seminal concept that influenced our thinking...
Heider' s concept of the perceived locus of causality for behavior"
(p. 12). Origins of attribution theory come through Heider from
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Duncker and Piaget. Heider (p. 66) notes "Duncker did not mean
to imply that there is a consciously rational process of analysis
into factors present; he talks about an attribution that occurs
'spontaneously' and immediately." (Duncker, 1947, p. 537). Heider
describes attribution as a process of ordering and classifying:
The immediate act of perception is accompanied by certain
kinds of perceptual activity which increase with age and
are loosely allied with intelligence. He (Piaget, 1950)
describes these perceptual activities under the labels
of decentralization, transportations
,
comparison, trans-
positions, etc. .. .Mediating condtions or intervening
circumstances are taken into account not only in the
perceptual mechanisms that make for object constancy,
but also in our behavior and expectations referring to
our own and other people's perceptions. This ordering
and classifying (of proximal stimuli) can often be
considered a process of attribution.
. .we find ourselves
in a certain situation, and something happens which has
to be fitted into the situation. It has to be attributed
to one or another contents of the environment, (p. 296)
Attribution theory concerns itself with the perception of
cause of behavior as opposed to any actual cause of the behavior
(Bern, 1967; Heider, 1958; Jones & Davis, 1955; Kelley, 1967, 1971).
It asks the question: To what does the individual attribute the
cause of his behavior? An "overjustification hypothesis" has
been derived from attribution theory by self-perception theorists.
Addition of reward to an already sufficiently justified activity
(intrinsically motivated) makes that behavior oversufficiently
justified. This overjustif ication hypothesis predicts that a
person's intrinsic interest in an activity can be decreased by
inducing him to engage in that activity as an explicit means to
some extrinsic goal. The individual will come to believe that
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his actions are the result of external contingencies as opposed
to his intrinsic interest in the activity. Overjusti fication
theory proposes that it is the re-attribution of causality from
internal reasons for one's own behavior to external ones that
accounts for decreased interest in subsequent activity after
reward procedures.
Attribution theory is not without its critics. In work
applicable to attribution theory, Weick (1967) reviewed studies
designed to increase favorability toward a dull task. He found
that attitude change toward the task (the supposed cause for
change to increased effort) often did not occur in instances of
increased effort. Hence, increased effort could not be attributed
to attitude change. Weick states that:
initial cognitive enhancement of the task followed by
increased effort simply does not occur often enough for
us to be convinced that this is a reasonable explanation.
Instead, it appears that the phenomenon in which we are
interested may involve just the opposite sequence of
events, namely behavioral change followed by occasional
attempts to summarize the experience eval uati vely. (p. 212)
Weick's discrepant findings on attribution are critiqued by
Bern (1975) who states, "One possible explanation (for failure to
find that attributions mediate behavior) is that the measures of
attributions are not well designed or appropriate to the self-
attribution which actually mediates the behavior. Another possi-
bility is that the subjects are hesitant to admit to some states
like anger. (Schacter and Singer, 1962)" (p. 51). Bern cites
Zimbardo (1969) and Brock and Grant (1963) as suggesting that
the attributions do change as predicted, and do mediate behavior,
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but are unconscious. Bern (1965, 1968) has suggested that individuals
need not be able to verbalize the cues they use in arriving at
self-attributions. He goes on to cite Zimbardo (1969, p. 269-273)
as providing a version of unconscious cognitions generating
empirical consequences, but cautions that they are close to "meta-
physics and invisibility."
Bern (1972, p. 52) believes that attributions follow behavioral
c'hange. The issue discussed in this paper is related not to what
occurred during the original attribution process but to the effects
on future behavior as a result of this attribution process.
In summary, it appears theoretically that an individual's
perceptions of whether his behavior is intrinsically or extrinsically
motivated (i.e. perceptions of locus of causality or control) can
affect his attitude toward a task, and, as a result, his performance
at that task.
CHAPTER I I
RESEARCH
This chapter will review research pertinent to the effects of
rewards on high base-rate behaviors. This research has been
performed largely within a framework of perceived locus of causality.
The process by which man explains and understands his own actions
and their causes has drawn interest in recent years (Bern, 1967,
1972; Jones & Davis, 1965; Kelley, 1967), although discerning
causes of events has been a central concern of social psychology.
Kelley (1967) and Bern (1967, 1972) suggest that processes of self-
attribution and self-perception function in the same manner as
processes of other-perception. Lepper, Greene, and Nisbett (1973)
explicate Bern's self-perception theory.
When an individual observes another person engaging in
some activity, he infers that the other is intrinsically
motivated to engage in that activity to the extent that
he does not perceive salient, unambiguous, and sufficient
extrinsic contingencies to which to attribute the other's
behavior. Self-perception theory proposes that a person
engages in similar processes of inference about his own
behavior and its meaning. To the extent that the external
reinforcement contingencies controlling his behavior
are salient, unambiguous, and sufficient to explain it,
the person attributes his behavior to these controlling
circumstances. But if external contingencies are not
perceived, or if they become unclear, invisible and
psychologically insufficient to account for his actions,
the person attributes his behavior to his own dispositions,
interests, and desire, (p. 129)
Lepper et al
.
(1973) state as one implication of self-perception
theory:
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an "overjustification" hypothesis—the proposition that a
person s intrinsic interest in an activity may be under-
mined by inducing him to engage in that activity as an
explicit means to some extrinsic goal. If the externaljustification provided to induce a person to engage in
an activity is unnecessarily high and psychologically
over-sufficient" the person might come to infer that
his actions were basically motivated by the external
contingencies of the situation rather than by any intrinsic
in the activity itself, (p. 130)
Effects of external rewards on intrinsic motivation
. Deci (1971)
was the first to experimentally study the effect of external rewards
on intrinsic motivation. He cites Atkinson (1964), deCharms (1968),
and Murray (1964) as predicting that external rewards decrease
intrinsic motivation, and goes on to state that "a review of the
literature has yet to receive a definitive empirical answer" (p. 105)
Deci hypothesized that rewarding a person with money or other
tangible reward for performing an intrinsically interesting activity
will decrease subsequent intrinsic interest in the activity. He
asked college students to solve interesting puzzles in three
experimental sessions, rewarding subjects for performance (session)
two in the experimental group and not rewarding a similar control
group. During a break in each session subjects were allowed to do
whatever they wished, including working on puzzles. Subjects in
the reward group showed a greater decrease in instrinsic motivation
than those in the control group. Results were of a level of
significance not customarily considered acceptable in the literature
. 10 > p > .05, and are referred to as "marginal" by Lepper et al
.
(1973).
In the same article, Deci reports on two other experiments
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tending to confirm his hypothesis: a field experiment of marginal
significance, and a third using the same general design as the first
but using verbal rewards and positive verbal feedback in place of
monetary rewards. Linder this feedback condition, intrinsic motiva-
tion tended to increase. Deci gives two reasons for failure to
reconcile his findings with those of the animal literature (see
Ferster and Skinner, 1957; Uhl and Young, 1967):
the finding of continued activity after removal of rewards
in studies with subhuman species may be accounted for
more parsimoniously by the process of resistance to
extinction than by an increase in intrinsic motivation.
It is suggested that human data might be fruitfully
viewed using a cognitive approach, since humans have
greater cognitive control over their own behavior and
motivation. A cognitive approach to this problem would
focus on the changes in the phenomenological interpreta-
tion of the task following the introduction of external
rewards. Second it is suggested that distinctions should
be made among the different kinds of external rewards.
(p. 107)
Deci's (1975) Cognitive Evaluation Theory is an attempt to
integrate experimental findings:
Proposition I: One process by which intrinsic motivation
can be affected is a change in perceived locus of causality
from internal to external. This will cause a decrease in
intrinsic motivation, and will occur, under certain circum-
stances, when someone receives extrinsic rewards for
engaging in intrinsically motivated activities, (p. 139)
Proposition II: The second process by which intrinsic
motivation can be affected is a change in feelings of
competence and self-determination. If a person's feelings
of competence and self-determination are enhanced, his
intrinsic motivation will increase. If his feelings of
competence and self-determination are diminished his
intrinsic motivation will decrease, (p. 141)
Proposition III: Every reward (including feedback) has
two aspects, a controlling aspect and on informational
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aspect which provides the recipient with information
about his competence and self-determination. The
relative salience of the two aspects determines
which process will be operative. If the controlling
aspect is more salient, it will initiate the change
in perceived locus of causality process. If the
informational aspect is more salient, the change in
feelings of competence and self-determination
process will be initiated, (p. 142)
He introduces a distinction based on whether the rewards are
perceived by the individual as controlling his behavior, as
dpposed to providing feedback, (p. 107)
Lepper
,
et al. (1973) state that the overjustification hypothesis
is "formulated in terms of the perception of oneself as having
undertaken an activity in order to obtain some extrinsic goal"
(p. 130), that the nature of the goal should be of little signifi-
cance, and, that "contracting explicity to engage in an activity
for a reward should undermine interest in the activity, even when
the reward is insubstantial or merely symbolic" (p. 130). Deci's
and Lepper' s predictions are reconcilable in that verbal rewards
are rarely the subject of contract. Deci suggests that verbal
rewards are not seen as rewards, but rather as providing information.
Expectedness of rewards . Provision of an unexpected reward following
the activity should have little effect on subsequent activity,
despite its magnitude, according to Lepper et al . , who studied the
question of expectedness experimentally. They chose children as
subjects for their experiment on the basis of demonstrated interest
in the activity (drawing with magic markers) during baseline, then
assigned them randomly to three groups: one group where children
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received no reward and were not expecting one, one where children
contracted to perform an activity and were subsequently rewarded
with a good player award, and one group where children were given
the good player award not having expected it. Children in the
expected award condition spent significantly less time playing with
the markers than children in the other conditions. Lepper et al
.
cite the fact that children were selected on the basis of high
initial interest as a possible reason for their finding that receipt
of reward did not act as a reinforcer to increase interest of
children in the unexpected reward group. Jung (1968) substantiates
this suggestion that "achievement [in a learning experiment] is a
reward itself... The level of motivation can be considered
sufficiently high so that it is difficult to manipulate it by
experimental treatments." (p. 22) Lepper also found the quality
of pictures drawn in the expected award condition to be lower than
the other groups, as based on ratings by three judges. They take
this, and the finding of decreased duration of activity, as
evidence of the overjustification effect.
Surveillance effects . Lepper and Greene (1975) expand on prior
research to conclude that surveillance also can act as a perceived
attempt at control of one's behavior. They cite Strickland's
1958 study, in which subjects served as supervisors over two
subordinates, in a situation of relatively high surveillance over
one and relatively low over the other. Despite the fact that
workers had performed equally well, supervisors saw the high
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surveillance workers as motivated primarily by the surveillance,
as less internally motivated, less trustworthy, and less likely
to perform adequately in the absence of surveillance. Subjects
subsequently chose to monitor the previously monitored worker more
often, insuring a circular process. Bern's self-perception theory
suggests that the worker in the situation operated on the same
attributional data to conclude that his behavior was the result
of the external contingencies. His initial interest had been
undermined by pressure.
Lepper and Green randomly assigned preschoolers to high, low
and no surveillance conditions orthogonally by expectation vs. no
expectation of reward. Reward consisted of a chance to play with
attractive toys (see Premack (1965) on preferred rewards). Subjects
receiving an expected reward were subsequently less likely to play
with the experimental puzzles when these puzzles were available
in a free-play situation. No significant differences were found
between high and low surveillance conditions, but a main effect
for surveillance was found. Surveillance produced an additional
decrease in later interest in the activity. Lepper and Greene
conclude that "The knowledge that one's performance at a task is
being observed and evaluated by someone else, even when there is
no explicit expectation of a tangible reward for engaging in the
activity appears sufficient to decrease later interest in the task"
(p. 484). Lepper and Green interpret the results in light of
the
Strickland 1958 study and self-perception theory to further conclude
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that if we "observe an actor engaging in an activity when extrinsic
pressures are great, we would attribute his behavior to the external
contingencies of the situation," and that "use of overly sufficient
pressure to induce a person to engage in an activity may produce
a self-sustaining and self-fulfilling cycle since both the source
and recipient of the pressure would be subject to the same attribu-
tional 'bias'" (p. 485). They state that "the teacher or supervisor
comes to believe that the child or worker is motivated only by
external pressure and therefore maintains that external pressure,
while maintenance of the pressure leads the worker or child to
believe that he is performing as a result of external factors, thus
making him less likely to engage in the behavior subsequently" (p.
485). This study is also noteworthy for the fact that frequency
of performance is measured, as well as duration, with significant
results for frequency.
Interaction of intrinsic and extrinsic motivation . Calder and Staw
(1975b) studied the relationship of external and internal factors
on the same behavior. They manipulated both intrinsic and extrinsic
motivation to test for interaction, as opposed to additivity of
the two factors. College students were randomly assigned to one
of four groups on two orthogonal dimensions, a money versus no
money reward condition (extrinsic versus non-extrinsic) and a blank
versus picture puzzle condition (intrinsically motivating verus
non-intrinsical ly motivating.) To avoid confounding with factors
which could lead to alternative explanations, Calder and Staw
chose
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as their activity one which could be labelled intrinsically
interesting in one case but not the other, would differ on an
affective (enjoyabil i ty) dimension as opposed to a cognitive or
behavioral dimension, and yet would consist of the same overt
behavior. Dependent variables were a task satisfaction questionnaire
and the number of minutes for which subjects volunteered for future
experiments. For the blank puzzle, ratings of enjoyabil ity increased
with introduction of monetary reward, while for the picture puzzle
ratings of enjoyability decreased with introduction of reward.
This finding supports deCharms 1 1968 hypothesis predicting the
interaction of intrinsic and extrinsic motivation. The pattern of
mean amount of time volunteered for future experiments followed the
pattern for ratings of enjoyability but did not reach statistical
significance. Calder and Staw attempt to account for both rein-
forcement effects and (overjustification) effects reported in the
literature. They expect "an inverse (or self-perception) effect
when a task is initially high in intrinsic interest and a direct
(or reinforcement) effect when there is initially less interest in
a task" (p. 600).
Calder and Staw (1975a) reviewed Deci's pre-1975 work and made
methodological observations, including the following: 1) Deci did
not report performance data, leaving interpretation open to
explanations of satiation or fatigue rather than a cognitive
re-evaluation of the task, and 2) there is the possibility that
individuals perceived the extrinsic reward as a bribe (Steiner, 1970)
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and that it is this reaction to the reward, and not a decrease in
intrinsic motivation, that is responsible for decreases in time
spent at the activity. In a reply, Deci (1975a) reports perfor-
mance data and states that since there are no significant differences
in performance data, fatigue and satiation are not acceptable
alternative explanations. Deci goes on to cite Kruglanski, Alon
and Lewis' 1972 finding that intrinsic interest for an activity
decreased when individuals received unexpected rewards after they
had performed interesting activities as evidence that the issue of
expectedness of rewards is not resolved. The bribe theory would not
be relevant to an unexpected reward situation since the activity
would already have been performed when the reward was presented,
and thus the individual would not see the reward as an attempt to
induce the activity as in a bribe.
Contingent vs. non-contingent rewards
. Both Deci (1975a) and
Calder and Staw (1975a) feel a need for further research on whether
or not both contingent and non-contingent rewards decrease intrinsic
motivation. Calder and Staw (p. 79) state that Kruglanski, Friedman,
and Zeevi (1971) found a decrease in intrinsic motivation for the
extrinsic, non-contingent reward condition in their experiment,
the difference being that the reward (a tour) was not contingent
on performance of the activity, as in the 1972b Deci experiment, but
rather on participation or non-participation in the experiment.
Calder and Staw posit that "contingency makes rewards more salient
as extrinsic forces," and that, "both contingent and non-contingent
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rewards decrease intrinsic motivation, but contingent rewards
produce the largest (sic) change" (p. 79). (See also Deci, 1975)
Measures of intrinsic motivation
. Calder and Staw (1975a) criticize
Deci and Lepper et al . studies for using persistence on a task as
their single measure of intrinsic motivation: "there are other
indicators which can and should be used in assessing intrinsic
motivation. Perhaps the most obvious indicator is reported task
satisfaction, since one certainly should like a task if he is
willing to perform it for no other apparent reward" (p. 79).
Kruglanski measured task enjoyment in 1971. Deci (1971) measured
task satisfaction, interest, and enjoyment for both experimental and
control groups. Kruglanski (1972) and Lepper et al (1973) measured
for preference. Thus, measures of intrinsic motivation other than
persistence have been used in the literature.
Content-consequence hypothesis . Kruglanski (1975) based his
distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic motivation on whether
the person's self-attributed cause for an activity inheres in its
content or its consequence. He states that the distinction is akin
to the distinction between stimulus and circumstance of Nisbett
and Valins (1971) and Valins and Nisbett (1971). This distinction
suggests that when money, or, presumably, any tangible reinforcer,
is inherent to the task, its presence should enhance intrinsic
motivation, since it provides a salient intrinsic cause for
performance, and, that whenever it is extrinsic to the task, its
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presence should lower Intrinsic motivation. Kruglanski varied
orthogonally a task dimension consisting of either a coin-toss
guessing game (money intrinsic) or a model construction task
(money extrinsic task) with a payment dimension where subjects
were given either points or the equivalent of a few cents in
currency. He found that subjects manifested a higher degree of
intrinsic motivation when payment was present versus absent for
the money intrinsic condition, on the basis of three questions
relating to interest and preference for the activity in relation
to alternative activities.
In a conceptual replication, Kruglanski substituted an
"Athletics Game" and a "Stock Market Game" for the former task
variables and told subjects in the money intrinsic, payment absent
conditions that they would be requested to return their cash profits.
The dependent measure consisted of the subject's self-reported
willingness to continue with the same game or to play another game.
Kruglanski interprets the similar results for the replication as
well as the previous experiment as lending support to the hypothesis
that when money is intrinsic to a task, its presence tends to
enhance intrinsic motivation, and that when it is extrinsic, its
presence lowers intrinsic motivation. He claims that this result
supports his content-consequence distinction, but not the internal
-
external distinction made by Deci (1971, 1972a, 1972b), since
salient, external rewards heightened intrinsic motivation in an
activity in one case and lowered it in another and hence cannot
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be a sufficient condition of extrinsic motivation. In both
conditions, monetary payment was contingent on degree of competence.
Krugl anski believes that his findings argue against identifica-
tion of intrinsic motivation with satisfaction of subjects' self-
determination and competence needs, since in one case payments
raised intrinsic motivation and in another lowered it. Kruglanski
states that in the money-extrinsic, payment-absent case, the
discontinued expectancy of reward could have led to frustration due
to non-reward and thus exacerbate the aversiveness experienced thus
accounting for decrement. He conducted "funnel -type postexperi-
mental" interviews yielding no signs of frustration or discontent.
This procedure is questionable in view of research indicating
subjects' reluctance to admit unpleasant emotions (Schacter & Singer,
1962).
Despite Kruglanski 's claims, the findings are not inconsistent
with a control versus information interpretation. Krugl anski 's
work confounds reward-as-consequence of an activity with reward-
under-the-discretion-of-another (but still as consequence). His
research does not discriminate between circumstances where reward
is the consequence of an activity (or inherent reward) and where
reward is the consequence of activity but is under the control of
another. Under this interpretation, subjects in the money-intrinsic,
payment-present, condition could have seen the reward as an indicator
of performance. Under Deci's 1975 cognitive evaluation theory
(see Chapter V), for example, reward in the money-intrinsic condition
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would not be seen as controlling since coin toss games typically
accord the coin to the winner. Hence, no change in perceived locus
of causality would occur. Subjects would see the results as
informational. In the money-extrinsic, payment-present conditions,
subjects could have seen provision of monetary reward as attempting
to influence (control) their subsequent participation in activities,
or their participation in the activity at hand. In the money-
intrinsic, payment absent condition, subjects may have seen removal
of rewards as control by others, initiating a change in perceived
locus of causality and diminishing intrinsic motivation. In the
money extrinsic condition, subjects would see reward as controlling,
and hence lower intrinsic motivation.
Kruglanski's distinction between perceptions of intrinsic
and extrinsic motivation on the basis of individuals' perceptions
of causality for their activity inhering in the content or conse-
wuence of the activity clarifies the concepts definitional ly. His
point that salient, external rewards cannot be viewed as a sufficient
condition of extrinsic motivation is well taken. As he demonstrates,
a salient, external reward is not necessarily perceived as a salient,
extrinsic reward, but can, in some cases be considered an intrinsic
part of a situation or activity.
Discounting principle . Kruglanski (1975a) investigated the attribu-
tional principle of discounting (Kelley, 1971) to account for the
negative relationship between magnitude or presence of extrinsic
rewards and intrinsic motivation. This principle suggests that
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presence of extrinsic cause for an activity lessens the individual's
tendency to attribute causality for his actions to intrinsic
factors (the individual discounts intrinsic reasons), and, conversely,
that presence of intrinsic causes lessens the tendency to attribute
extri nsi cal ly
.
(Note the similarity of the discounting principle
to Bern's self-perception theory.) Kruglanski provided three
conceptual replications varying on extrinsic versus an intrinsic
task-motivation dimension versus various measures of intrinsic
interest, including subjects' ratings, volunteering time, and
whether an individual was willing to contribute to a charitable
organization. He interpreted his results as indication that "the
extent of (perceived) intrinsic motivation varies positively, and
the extent of (perceived) extrinsic motivation varies negatively,
with the magnitude of task-intrinsic rewards. . .the attribution that
the extrinsic pay causes one's performance of the task was lower
when a plausible alternative cause, notably task intrinsic rewards,
was present versus absent" (p. 704). Subjects in the high intrinsic
reward condition, for example, recommended lower pay for their work
than subjects in a low intrinsic (extrinsic) reward condition.
Magnitude of a reward can be expected to correlate highly with
sal ience.
Salience of reward . Ross (1975) performed two experiments designed
to test whether a highly salient task-contingent reward is more
detrimental to intrinsic interest than a less salient reward. In
the first experiment, children in a salient reward condition were
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shown a cue reminding them of the expected reward, while in the
non-salient reward condition, they were not shown the cue. The
subjects in the cued, salient-reward condition played less with the
rewarded activity in immediate and delayed (4 weeks) trials than
did either less-salient or control (no reward) subjects. The
second experiment varied, 1) a distraction condition where subjects
were asked to think about an unrelated topic with 2) a think-about-
reward condition and 3) a condition where subjects were asked not
to ideate (control). Subjects in the distraction conditions and
control subjects showed more interest in the activity (drum playing)
than the think-about-reward condition. The competing response
hypothesis would predict that the distraction condition and the
think-about-reward condition subjects would both subsequently show
less interest in the activity than control subjects, a proposition
not born out by the Ross 1975 results.
On the basis of Kelley's discounting hypothesis (1972) stating
that not all of the possible causes of a behavior may be salient
at a given time, Ross states that it would be possible to maximize
or minimize the salience of external consequences. He predicts
that a highly salient reward would induce subjects to perceive
their behavior as extrinsical ly motivated, and, conversely, that
subjects would attribute behavior to intrinsic reasons in the
absence of external determinants. Ross dismisses rival hypotheses
of satiation or reinforcement of differential activity after
measuring perceived effort and number of thumps as indices or
controls for satiation and differential reinforcement effects.
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Ross performed a second experiment to increase general iz-
ability of results. Ross measured instrinsic interest immediately,
on the basis of duration of contact with the drum, the first toy
that the child contacted during free play and a question by the
experimenter as to the most "fun thing" in the room. He measured
duration and first toy contacted in the delayed assessment (4 weeks).
Ross found that subjects in the distraction and control conditions
showed more interest in the target activity. He states that "The
comparison between the distraction and control conditions supports
the evidence from Experiment One that an anticipated reward need
not reduce intrinsic motivation." He goes on to state that a
decrease in intrinsic motivation is most likely to occur when the
reward is salient, that it varies as a function of the salience of
the reward. He states that "distraction will (not) always be
/ beneficial to intrinsic motivation" and posits that distraction
would be more likely to disrupt activities requiring greater
concentration, and that the task in his experiment was fairly
mechanical
.
Frustration and delay of gratification effects . Ross goes on to
note that the attribution hypothesis does not provide the only
possible explanation of the results. Intrinsic motivation studies
often involve a delay between the promise and attainment of reward.
Frustration generated by waiting for the reward may become associated
with the task and make the task aversive. Mischel and Ebbesen (1970)
and Mischel, Ebbesen and Zeiss (1972) found that cues which increase
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the salience of anticipated rewards reduce young children's
ability to delay gratification, possibly by increasing the aversive-
ness of the delay period. "The greater and more vivid the anticipa-
tion of the reward, the greater frustration generated by its
delay (p. 335). Mischel reasons that conditions decreasing
attention to an anticipated reward should reduce frustration, making
it less aversive to wait. Ross discusses how Mischel's theory is
supported by his Experiment Two, in that subjects who were distracted
during the activity, and thus from the reward, did not show a
decrease in intrinsic motivation. Ross notes, "asking subjects to
ideate did not seem to reduce their activity on the drum... diff-
erences during the free-play period cannot be readily attributed
to either satiation or reinforcement of differential activity"
(p. 251).
As Ross notes, frustration theory cannot account for other
variables such as surveillance (studied by Lepper and Greene, 1975)
or deadlines (studied by Amabile, DeJong and Lepper, 1976). Ross
(1976) tested a delay of gratification hypothesis: that it is the
temporal association of the task with a frustrating delay period
which produces the decrement in intrinsic motivation. Mischel
(1974) demonstrated that a waiting period between promise of reward
and its attainment produces frustration for young children. Ross
cites Lepper et al.'s (1973) findings that unanticipated reward
does not produce decrement as support for his hypothesis, since
if reward is not expected, there is no frustration at its delay.
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He also cites Piaget (1970) as suggesting that the young child
is incapable of dealing with several aspects of a situation
simultaneously, due to the egocentric nature of his thought and
small capacity to shift attention from one aspect of a situation
to another. They delay of gratification hypothesis requires less
cognitive ability than an attributional perspective, which requires
that the child consider multiple plausible causes for an activity
at once. (Bern suggests this consideration need not be conscious.)
Ross suggests that these delay periods do not produce frustration
in an adult.
Attribution theory vs. delay of gratification hypothesis
.
Ross
states that attribution theory asserts that it is the contingency
between task and reward, while the delay of gratification hypothesis
proposes that it is association of reward with delay, which is
primarily responsible for decrement. Ross contrasted three treat-
ments: a control condition where no reward was promised or given,
a condition where subjects were presented with a reward contingent
upon their waiting for an experimenter to return, and a condition
where subjects were presented the reward contingent upon performance
of the same interpolated activity as conditions one and two,
performed in the experimenter's absence. Frustration or delay of
gratification hypothesis proposes that it is the subjects' waiting
for the reward which causes decrement, and hence both experimental
conditions should produce decrement. The attribution hypothesis
predicts that only where reward is contingent on performance of
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the task, and not contingent on the wait, would a decrement occur.
Ross also used an individual difference measure of delay of
gratification based on Mischel and Gilligan's (1964) scale to
determine whether the delay period would be more frustrating to
subjects who have little ability to delay gratification. No main
effects were found for the delay of gratification variable. Subjects
in the waiting contingent condition played with the activity (Bic
Banana pens) for a significantly longer period of time than the
subjects whose reward was contingent on performance of the task.
These data support the attributional or overjusti fication analysis
and are not consistent with the delay of gratification hypothesis.
I Competing response hypothesis . Other attempts to explain over-
justification effects include Reiss and Sushinsky's (1975) explana-
tion of these effects in terms of the competing response hypothesis
of Child and Waterhouse (1952). The competing response hypothesis
is an interference interpretation posed by Child and Waterhouse
as an alternate, sufficient explanation for low quality of play
data presented by Barker, Dembo, and Lewin (1941). These latter
authors interpreted these data as indicating regression caused by
frustrating constructiveness of play. Barker, et al . had originally
posed the competing response hypothesis as one of a number of
possible explanations for decreased constructiveness; they rejected
it as a sufficient explanation.
Child and Waterhouse (1952) state that,
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children showed a lower constructiveness of play in
the frustration situation than in the free-play
situation.
. .frustration of one activity will produce
lowered quality of performance in the second activity
to the extent that it leads to the making of responses
that are incompatible with or interfere with the
responses of the second activity. This may be called
and interference interpretation, (p. 191)
Child and Waterhouse introduce the notion that competing
responses interfere with quality of performance. Reiss and Sushinsky
pose the following as responses capable of interfering with play:
perceptual distraction, cognitive distraction, excitement in
anticipation of reward (Miller and Estes, 1961; Sheffield, 1966).
Perceptual distraction would involve looking at the reward, for
example, and cognitive would involve thinking about the reward.
Reiss and Sushinsky (p. 1118) imply that cognitive distraction is
the factor accounting for decrement in the Lepper et al
. 1973
study. Reiss and Sushinsky cite McCullers and Martin (1971),
Miller and Estes (1961), and Spence (1971) as demonstrating the
distracting effect of material rewards.
Reiss and Sushinsky (1976) propose that "for any particular
play activity there exists a set of responses that facilitates task
enjoyment" (p. 235), including attention to the activity, performance
of the activity in the absence of aversive affect, at a relaxed
pace, and successful performance. Responses that interfere with
responses that facilitate task enjoyment are called competing
responses and include "performance anxiety, frustrative delay of
reward, embarrassment or guilt if the reward is perceived as
socially inappropriate, hurried rates or performance. . .and visual
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and cognitive distraction" (p. 235). They state further that
exposure to two reinforcing activities such as intrinsically
motivated activity and reward may arouse approach-approach conflict.
Possible explanations for persistent loss of intrinsic motivation
due to competing responses include: 1) the arousal of unpleasant
affect leading to aversive Pavlovian conditioning, 2) recognition
by the subject that he did not enjoy the activity, and 3) arousal
of competing responses impairing quality of performance, with the
subject's recognition of the impairment mediating a persistent
effect.
Reiss and Sushinsky state "that a major prediction of the
competing response hypothesis is that many decreased play effects
are stimulus novelty effects that weaken over repeated trials of
reward contingent on performance quality." The prediction is
based on the assumption that responses interfering with task enjoy-
ment also interfere with responses facilitating performance quality
(Farber, 1955). Thus, making rewards contingent on quality of
performance should extinguish responses which compete with
performance quality and enjoyment.
Reiss and Sushinsky (1976) stress their interpretation of
Lepper and Greene as well as Calder and Staw's studies as being a
function of robust stimulus novelty effects as opposed to any
effect on the individual's intrinsic motivation. Reiss and Sushinsky
state that the results would therefore not be similar in studies
using multiple-trial procedures. They state as evidence of their
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assertion that "the available evidence from control group studies
consistently reveals that token enconomies are associated with
positive response generalization" including feelings of self-
confidence and a tendency for internal attributions of behavior
(Disci pio & Trudeau, 1972; Maley, Feldman, & Ruskin, 1973; Reiss,
1973; Reiss & Sushinsky, 1975, Experiment Tewo; Eitzen, 1975)
(Reiss & Sushinsky, 1976, p. 234).
Reiss and Sushinsky state that it is sufficient but not
necessary for any competing response to produce a decreased play
effect, and, that while Ross (1976) and Greene and Lepper (1974)
studied frustrative delay of reward and performance anxiety,
respectively, other competing responses could have interfered
with the activity in question and thus negatively affected play.
Testing the competing response hypothesis
. In order to compare
the overjustification hypothesis directly with the competing
response hypothesis, Reiss and Sushinsky (1976) performed two
experiments. The first replicated the Lepper et al
.
(1976) studies
while not confounding exposure to a distracting stimulus with verbal
instructions defining the stimulus as a reward. The authors varied
exposure vs. no-exposure to a tangible stimulus with promise vs.
no-promise of reward. Expectation of reward was assured by asking
questions of the subjects, and repeating instructions if it was
apparent the instructions had not been understood. Subjects in
the exposure-promise condition listened to a target activity (a
song) less on a pretest than subjects in the no-exposure, no-promise
.r
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test. A main effect for pre-exposure was not statistically reliable
but the main effect for promise of reward showed that individuals
promised a reward would be less likely to engage in the activity
subsequently. Demonstration of a pre-exposure effect could have
been interpreted as support for the competing response hypothesis,
but not for the overjustification hypothesis. Results could be
interpreted easily from a competing response or overjustification
perspective.
Experiment One had been designed to maximize the likelihood
subjects would think about the reward at the expense of listening
to and enjoying the music. Experiment Two was designed to produce
a rei nforcement effect without interfering with behavior practiced
during experimental training. The competing response hypothesis
predicts that a decreased play effect will not occur if the behavior
is not interfered with by a reward. Experiment Two involved rein-
forcing nine children for listening to one song and not reinforcing
them for listening to two others. Discrimination training consisted
of giving each child a token after the child had listened to the
target song for scheduled but varying lengths of time (token two-
15 seconds; token three--20 seconds; token four--35 seconds; token
five--20 seconds). As evidence for the success of discrimination
training, the authors note that two fo the nine subjects listened
to the target song when songs were first introduced, but that seven
went to the target song following the discrimination training.
Means of 350 seconds vs. 145.6 seconds were found for time spent
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listening to the target song vs. time spent listening to the
preferred non-target song. Reiss and Sushinsky cite these means
and the fact that six subjects had listened to the target song
more than to either of the other two songs (p. > .04 binomial test)
as evidence that target song preference engendered by discrimination
training had transferred to a post-test situation and thereby
discontinued the overjustification hypothesis prediction of
decreased interest in the target song.
Criticism of competing response hypothesis experiments
. In reply
to Reiss and Sushinsky, Lepper and Greene (1976) question whether
children may have perceived implicit or explicit social contingencies
in the post-test situation, whether they were responding on the
basis of the demand characteristics of the situation (Orne, 1962,
1969; Miller, 1972). Demand characteristics include such factors
as adult expectation of the children. Other contingencies would
include expectation of reward at post-test due to presence of
discriminative stimuli. Lepper and Greene also question the effects
of such factors as increasing familiarity with the target song
(Zajonc, 1968) and changes in liking for the non-reinforced
alternatives. Lepper and Greene criticized failure to provide
control groups which would "allow an examination of the aftereffects
of the reward programs per se, unconfounded with other changes in
classroom procedures and/or changes in adult behavior" (p. 32)
accompanying token economy introduction. A control would serve
to help discern whether "potentially controlling extrinsic
45
contingencies" determine the extent of the generalization. Kazdin
(1973) states that the contingent social behaviors and systematic
observation techniques taught classroom or hospital personnel do
not disappear when tokens are not available. If behavior is
contolled by powerful extrinsic contingencies, it cannot be classified
as intrinsically motivated behavior.
An alternate explanation for these results involves the
possibility that subjects expected reward at post-test. Discrimi-
native stimuli which could have mediated this expectation include
presentation of the tape recorders and songs used in the training
procedure, the presence of outside observers, and being in a room
in groups of three, as well as combinations of the above. No
evidence is provided by Reiss and Sushinsky that subjects did not
expect a reward, nor do they report telling the subjects they
would not receive a reward.
Reiss and Sushinsky attempt to refute Lepper and Greene's
criticism that situational cues mediated expectation of reward by
noting that the only similarity between training and post-testing
conditions was the presence of observers, and different observers
in each case, with no interaction with the children, and that "the
children seemed to ignore the observers." The assumption that the
presence of observers was not noticed by the children and that
this presence of strangers observing their behavior had no effect
as a discriminative stimulus relating training to testing situation
is open to question. Not enough information is provided to
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determine whether presentation of reward was confounded with verbal
procedures, which have been shown by Deci to increase intrinsic
motivation.
Behavior contrast effects
. Lepper and Greene (1976) criticize
Reiss and Sushinsky for suggesting that previous token economy
studies would lead the reader to dismiss a priori the overjustifica-
tion hypothesis. Specifically, Reiss and Sushinsky (1975) state
that "a much more detailed account of reward procedures, including
the effects of saliency and amount of reward, already exists"
(p. 1123). The behavior modification literature has dealt with
decreases in behavior following termination of reward under the
term "successive behavior contrast" (Dunham, 1968) which refers to
a behavior's increasing and remaining above baseline when reward
is available but decreasing below baseline when reward contingencies
are withdrawn. Deci (1975) states that the lack of findings of
behavior contrast effects may be due to the use of animals in
the investigations. Lepper and Greene (1976) also note that the
behavior contrast phenomenon is discussed in the animal research.
The assumption implicit in both Deci and Lepper and Greene is that
animals would presumably not be capable of cognitions relating to
perceived locus of causality or to overjustification. Reiss and
Sushinsky suggest dismissal of the Lepper work because behavior
drops to baseline levels but not below baseline when rewards are
withdrawn, and, that neither negative (contrast) or positive
(generalization) effects have typically been found in attempts to
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assess generalization of token system effects to non-prograrrmed
environments, (Johnson, Bolstad and Lobitz, in press; Kazdin and
Bootzin, 1972; O'Leary and Drabman, 1971). Lepper and Greene
(1976) note instances of contrast effects in studies where
appropriate comparisons are available in non-programmed settings:
Colvin, 1973; Johnson et al., in press; Meichenbaum et al
. ,
1968.
Reiss and Sushinsky (1975) state that, "no reinforcement
procedure employing tangible rewards has produced deleterious 'side
effects' beyond chance levels" (p. 1123). Winett and Winkler (1972),
Feingold and Mahoney (1975) and Levine and Fasnacht (1975, 1976)
speak of side effects in situations where their production is
unlikely to be measured.
Lepper and Greene draw a conceptual line between behavior which
is a function of environmental contingencies and behavior occurring
in the seeming absence of salient external contingencies. On the
basis of work by Collins ( 1973), Kelman (1958), and Rosenhan (1969),
they state that the same treatment may have one effect in settings
where external constraints are present and another when constraints
are absent. Rosenhan found, for example, that techniques most
effective in promoting compliance with an adult norm also were
least effective in promoting internalization of that norm, as
evidenced by subjects' subsequent behavior in their classroom, in
the absence of external pressures. Assuming the Rosenhan factors
operate in the Reiss and Sushinsky study, one might conclude that
Reiss and Sushinsky merely measured at the wrong time to find
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contrast effects, and that had the experimenters or other
discriminative stimuli not been present, results would have been
more similar to results reported in the overjustification literature.
Re-solved puzzle. Reiss and Sushi nsky state that "Since a puzzle
is no longer puzzling once solved, Rice (1946) noted that interest
in re-solving the same puzzle is likely to be low (cf. Rosenzweig,
1933). Rice suggested that the rewarded beahvior in such situations
be defined as 'solving previously unsolved puzzles' so that reward
for solving Puzzle A increases the probability that the subject
will solve Puzzle B" (p. 239). Reiss and Sushinsky are also open
to the re-solved puzzle criticism, since in their study, post-
testing of subjects was on songs that had been rewarded and listened
to 10 times. If overjustification effects generalize, while Reiss
and Sushinsky elevated the rate of the particular song-listening
behavior, they may have decreased song-listening behavior in general
or of listening to new songs. Because of subjects' perceptions of
attempts to control their behavior, in the future they might tend
to avoid the controllers of their behavior or experience psychological
reactance. Note also that the overjustification hypothesis would
predict decreases in time spent listening to the particular song
upon leaving a situation where reward procedures as discriminative
stimuli were present.
Qua! ity of play . Reiss and Sushinsky criticize Lepper and Greene's
work for confounding differing practice experiences with experimental
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training conditions. Specifically, they state that promised-reward
subjects practiced hurried and/or low quality play prior to reward,
compared to other subjects. Citing Logan (1972) the author's reason
that a subject "who practices a response in a sloppy and inefficient
manner learns to behave in a sloppy and inefficient manner," (Reiss
& Sushinsky, 1976, pp. 1057-1058). Reiss and Sushinsky (1975) state
that the capacity of salient rewarding stimuli to elicit responses
that interfere with ongoing behavior can be assumed to habituate.
(Reiss and Wagner, 1972). When rewards are introduced children
often become excited and consequently exhibit low-quality performance"
(p. 1118). Reiss and Sushinsky predict that these "stimulus novelty"
effects will subside as excitement subsides during repeated trials,
and that decreased play effects will not be associated with multiple-
trial contingent procedures.
Demonstration of a relationship between quality and duration
is necessary for one to claim that interference with quality accounts
for decrement. Ross (1976) found a nonsignificant (r=.19) correla-
tion between quality of drawing and persistence or amount of time
spent prior to reward attainment. Lack of correlation between
quality of drawing and amount of time spent is interpreted as
refutation of Reiss and Sushinsky's interpretation of Lepper and
Greene's work. Lepper and Greene (1973) and Greene and Lepper
(1974) found that subjects in expected reward conditions produced
lower quality drawings prior to receiving the reward. It would be
necessary to a distraction explanation based on interference with
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quality to demonstrate a direct relationship between quality and
duration, since such a criticism claims decrement as a result of
rewarding low quality drawing. Rewarding low quality play could
not be an explanation for decrement in the Ross work since decre-
ment and low quality of play do not correlate. Lepper and Greene
(1976) also take issue with Reiss and Sushinsky's suggestion that
children learned to engage in low-quality play. They cite studies
by' Calder and Staw (1975), Deci et al
.
(1975), Kruglanski et al
.
(1972), Kruglanski et al
.
(1975), Smith (1975), and Ross et al
.
(1975) as well as unpublished research by Greene et al (1974) to
substantiate their assertion that performance differences during
treatment "are not necessary to produce subsequent decrements
in intrinsic motivation to engage in tasks subjects had previously
contracted to engage in for tangible rewards" (pp. 29-30).
Weaknesses of the competing response hypothesis . Reiss and Sushinsky
interpret the Ross (1976) study in terms of performance anxiety as
the competing response. They base their conclusions of superiority
of the competing response hypothesis as an explanation of Ross'
results on the basis of a non-statistical ly reliable difference
between means in Ross' wait-contingent and control groups. On
this basis they claim that the competing response hypothesis
explains the Ross results better than the overjustification hypothesis,
since, "wait contingent procedures alleviated performance anxiety
perhaps by encouraging children not to perceive the task as
evaluative" (p. 240). Note that Reiss and Sushinsky use a cognitive
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explanation (perception of evaluation) relating to locus of
control (one is evaluated by another). Thus, their explanation
does not change the nature of the causality involved, but removes
the locus-of-control antecedent one step from the behavior:
cogni tion--decrement versus cogni tion--interference--decrement.
Similarly, they interpret the task-contingent condition as enhancing
anxiety (presumably because of cognitive recoil or reactance at
evaluation). If an affective state such as anxiety or frustration
is responsible for decrement via an interference, then it should
be measurable or demonstrable. Judgment will be reserved until
such data are available.
Thus, Reiss and Sushinsky 1) base their conclusions regarding
superiority of the competing response hypothesis over the justifica-
tion hypothesis on data that are not demonstrated to be statistically
reliable, and 2) do not change the nature of the cognitive explana-
tion for the behavior, but see it as followed by a mediator, the
presence of which is not demonstrated, only speculated. Interference
is seen as the direct antecedent of decrement, with a cognitive
process the antecedent of the interference. Interference might
thus be seen by Reiss and Sushinsky as the vehicle as opposed to
the cause of the decrement.
Reiss and Sushinsky interpret Calder and Staw's work showing
an increase in interest in a boring activity which was rewarded
as follows: "diversion of attention away from a boring activity
should enhance enjoyment by competing with attentional responses
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that facilitate boredom" (p. 241). Contrary to Reiss and Sushinsky's
assertion, an increase in the blank pictures activity for rewarded
groups is predicted, since, with reward provision, subjects have
justification for engaging in an uninteresting activity.
The competing response hypothesis fails to specify both the
conditions under which interference occurs (what makes a response
interfere) and the differential interference of rewards on behavior
(v/hy does a response interfere with some responses and not others).
For example, why would not a competing response interfere with
those responses associated with performing the activity in spite
of its boring character instead of interfering only with the responses
facilitating boredom? Why do some responses interfere and not
others? In the Ross study, why does frustrative delay not interfere?
Without clear specification of both conditions under which inter-
ference occurs, and parameters for differential response interfer-
ence, an opportunistic interpretation of data is possible.
Reiss and Sushinsky re-interpret results of the Lepper, Sagotsky
and Greene (Note 1) study cited by Lepper and Greene as supporting
the overjusti f ication, as opposed to the competing response, hypo-
thesis. Reiss and Sushinsky specify an approach-approach attentional
conflict as being highly distracting and aversive. They indicate
as responses capable of competing with responses that facilitate
task enjoyment: anxiety, frustration, embarrassment, guilt,
perceptual and cognitive distraction, and approach-approach decrement
and responses mentioned by Reiss and Sushinsky as competing with
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responses facilitating task enjoyment has not been attempted. Note
that it is not reward that distracts from performance necessarily,
but cognitions or affective states induced by presentation of
reward. Until such a relationship is established, and the affective,
perceptual and cognitive states demonstrated following prediction
of such effects, no positive preliminary conclusions can be drawn
concerning the competing response hypothesis. Demonstration of
the effects and the relationship will not, however, disconfirm the
overjusti f ication hypothesis, since the overjustification hypothesis
does not dispute that some responses do interfere with behavior.
Reiss and Sushinsky dismiss findings of attribution studies
on the basis that one of the preconditions for the overjustification
effect is the salience of reward, and, that making a reward salient
also makes it distracting. This appraisal of reward procedures does
not explain how, for example, reinforcement effects can be produced,
since if a reward is always distracting one would always expect
decrement following administration. Since this does not appear to
be the case, one must assume that making a reward salient does
not always make it distracting, or, that distraction (interference)
does not always provide decrement. Furthermore, an examination of
research other than that specified by Reiss and Sushinsky reveals
results in accordance with overjustification predictions, where
competing response explanations would have to be broadened even
more to account for the same results. For example, it seems unlikely
that the prospect of getting course credits would distract from
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or interfere with performance in Weick's (1964) study. Weick
found an increment in groups where course credits were withdrawn.
Reiss and Sushi nsky further note that a single trial of reward
will not tend to identify the targeted behavior, but that multiple
trial procedures will. Operational ly, for Reiss and Sushinsky,
identifying the rewarded behavior would involve producing a rein-
forcement effect during training. As noted earlier, such a
demonstration may not be possible with high base-rate behavior
(Jung, 1968). Reiss and Sushinsky (1976) state:
the major point of our experiment is that it is of much
greater interest that the subsequent decreased play
effect fails to occur when stimulus novelty and other
competing response effects are controlled for by the
production of rei nforcement effects, (p. 239)
By insisting that reinforcement effects be a control, they are
limiting the discussion to non-high base-rate behaviors, by their
definition, since an elevation of base-rate is not easily achievable
for an already high base-rate behavior.
Counter conditioning
. Reiss and Sushinsky (1976) posit a counter
conditioning procedure to explain decrement:
The major prediction of our competing response hypothesis
is that many decreased play effects are stimulus novelty
effects that weaken over repeated trials of reward
contingent upon performance qual i ty. . .based on the assump-
tion that for many activities, most responses that interfere
with task enjoyment also compete with responses that
facilitate performance quality. Hence reward contingent
upon performance quality should often constitute a counter
conditioning procedure that extinguishes responses that
compete with both performance quality and task enjoyment.
(p. 235)
Call A the reward, B enjoyment, and C quality. Reiss and Sushinsky
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suggest that because A interferes with B and C (although not
always), making A contingent upon C should extinguish responses
competing with B and C, i.e. produce an increment in B and C.
One might expect decrement if conditioning, rather than Reiss
and Sushinsky's posited counter conditioning were operating. In
order for Reiss and Sushinsky's analysis to follow logically, one
would have to assume that somehow A, the reward, changes in
character from an entity that interferes with responses to an entity
that enhances them. The only mechanism specified is one of counter
conditioning. Strictly speaking (Staats, 1975), counter conditioning
involves presentation of an additional stimulus more powerful
positively (in this case) than the negative aspects of the original
stimulus. Note that no additional stimulus is presented here,
since quality of task performance could only have been changed if
reward has an accelerative as opposed to an interfering effect on
the behavior. It is necessary that the counter conditioning stimulus
elicit the new response more strongly than does the original
conditioned stimulus (Staats, 1975, p. 26).
Reiss and Sushinsky seem to refer not to a counter conditioning
procedure, but to a procedure where a reward changes in character
from an entity that interferes with task enjoyment and quality to
an entity which becomes reinforcing, based on its association with
aspects of the behavioral situation (quality of performance) with
which it formerly interfered. A weakness of this explanation,
employing both conditioning factors and what Reiss and Sushinsky
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call counter conditioning factors concerns its failure to specify
the conditions under which either factor occurs. Thus, if both
conditioning procedures are equally likely (since conditions for
their occurrence are not specified) we are left with a supposed
explanation with very little predictive value. This lack of
predictive value is underscored by Reiss and Sushinsky's discussion
of the relationship between competing responses and task quality
and enjoyment. They note that work by Church (1969), Farber (1955),
Freedman (1966), Sanders and Baron (1975), and Solomon (1964)
indicates that responses interfering with enjoyment do not always
interfere with quality, and that, in some cases (Church, Solomon),
noxious stimuli facilitate performance, (p. 315)
Observe that Reiss and Sushinsky do not specify the conditions
under which performance and quality correlate. Also note research
cited by Ross (1976, p. 446) investigating the relationship between
quality of task performance and task enjoyment (as measured by
duration) finding no quality-duration relationship. Finally,
Reiss and Sushinsky exempt socially inappropriate rewards (of which
rewarding an intrinsically motivated activity is an instance) from
circumstances under which they predict stimulus novelty effects to
subside. Note that an assumption behind work on locus of control
or overjustification effects has to do with the individual's
cognitive appraisal of a behavior-reward situation as to its propriety,
including social propriety.
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Competing response: suffi cient but not necessary
. Proponents of
the competing response hypothesis have not demonstrated its merit
as a necessary condition for response decrement following reward.
One might expect, however, that it would be a sufficient cause for
decrement. Reiss and Sushinsky predict that interference at reward
will diminish with progressive presentations of reward. This
prediction could imply 1) that subjects' perceptions of reward
change (reward diminishes in salience) with progressive familiarity
and 2) that as reward becomes progressively familiar, its infor-
mational aspects become more salient as its controlling and/or
interfering aspects decrease. Note that in either case, the original
presentation of the reward can be expected to have deleterious
effects, and that the original presentation or association of
reward with behavior will commonly occur at the introduction of
the activity. One might expect, on this basis, that interfering
aspects of reward will be associated with novel situations. An
implication would involve a decrease in an individual's probability
of engaging in novel activities.
A circumstance differing from 1 and 2 above can be derived
from Premack's (1965) demonstration that a more preferred activity
has reinforcing properties toward a less preferred activity. While
it may be that interference accounts for decrement in situations
where the reward is more preferred than the activity, it seems
unlikely that a reward less preferred, less salient than the activity
will interfere with that activity. Correspondingly, we would expect
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it not to produce frustration at removal, excitement in anticipa-
tion, etc. Research has shown that a reward can produce an
evaluation relating to a locus of control (overjusti f ied, hence
must be controlling) which has deleterious effect on the behavior.
Locus of control
. Reiss and Sushinsky (1975) state that the
behavior modification literature strongly suggests that
perceived locus of self-behavior is a relatively unimpor-
tant variable for understanding the effects of reward
' procedures on overt behavior. Specifically, a critical
determinant of overt behavior is not perceptions of
behavior as a consequence of reward...but rather percep-
tions of reward as a consequence of behavior, ability
or luck, as well as the subject's perception of the
motives of the reinforcing agent (p. 1123).
Available research casts doubt on Reiss and Sushinsky's
assertion relating to locus of control; Weiner and Dubanoski (1975)
found that duration and quantity of responses were greater when
students selected their own schedule of reinforcement as compared
with others who had their schedules selected for them. A study by
Amabile, DeJong and Lepper (1976) found that in the absence of
external constraints, students who had deadlines imposed for a
series of interesting games spent less time at those games than
students who did not have deadlines imposed, regardless of whether
the deadline was explicit or implicit. Chapter V deals with the
locus of control concept at greater length.
Research by Kruglanski (1975) investigating the effects of
rewards inherent to the task's content vs. rewards perceived as a
consequence of this activity sheds light upon this question. Reward
will be perceived as a consequence of behavior, ability, or luck
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providing the reward is concimitant with or an inherent aspect of
the activity or situation. If the reward is perceived as an attempt
to control the individuals behavior, the behavior will be seen as
a consequence of reward. A plausibility statement could be made
as follows: Behavior will be seen as a consequence of reward to
the extent (as a function of) it is (its being) a consequence of
reward. One might add that to the extent that reward is used in
an attempt to control another's behavior, it will be seen as an
attempt at control. The relationship will be functional but not
direct. Work by Brehm (1966, 1972) reviewed in Chapter V indicates
that to the extent that rewards are seen as attempts at control of
the individual's behavior, the individual will react against the
control such that his own control of the situation will be restored.
(See also Skinner, 1971)
Summary . Research investigating an overjustification effect is
reviewed in this chapter. This research demonstrates a negative
effect on behavior subsequent to rewarding that behavior. Though
the research is done primarily from a perception-of-intrinsic versus
a perception-of-extrinsic motivation perspective (or perceived locus
of causality), the behavior will be characterized as high base-rate
for purposes of this paper. A self-perception or perceived locus
of causality theoretical background is used for most of this
research. Questions of perceived locus of causality are related
to social conditions surrounding reward procedures and are based
on self- and other-perception. An individual perceives that his
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behavior is externally (internally) caused on the basis of percep-
tions of external and internal cues relating to whether his
behavior is insufficiently or oversuff iciently justified. If an
individual sees his behavior as oversuff iciently justified he will
see it as externally controlled. Relative intrinsicity is thus a
perception based on cues interpreted by individuals with predisposi-
tions to interpret or apprehend information from a perspective of
relative i ntri nsici ty-extri nsici ty, a perspective based partially
on the individual's past experience. (See work by Rotter in Chapter
V)
Frustrative delay of reward as the factor producing decrement
is investigated with negative results. A competing response hypothesis
is used by behaviorist theorists in an attempt to explain findings
of this overjustification research "more parsimoniously." Competing
response theorists have not demonstrated that their concept will
subsume the findings of the overjustification research. Methodo-
logical problems with the overjustification literature, elucidated
by competing response theorists, are addressed in the following
chapter. An experiment is designed to shed light upon stimulus
novelty questions, as well as to investigate generalization of
overjustification effects.
CHAPTER I I I
METHODOLOGY
Chapter III concerns itself with the following: 1) An hypo-
thesis relating to the generalization of the deferred negative
effects of reward procedures on high base-rate activities is
presented; 2) Methodology issues raised earlier in this paper will
be discussed for purposes of explaining how the experiment designed
avoids the methodological criticisms raised in Chapter II; and
3) Materials and testing procedures for this experiment are
described.
Presentation of hypothesis
. Chapter II discussed research relating
to the deferred negative effects of rewards on behavior. Of
perhaps more interest than the negative effects of rewards on
individual behaviors is the possibility that these negative effects
will generalize to other behaviors.
To recapitulate, an overjustification hypothesis has been
proposed by self-perception theorists. This hypothesis states
that a person's intrinsic interest in an activity can be decreased
by inducing him to engage in that activity as an explicit means
to some extrinsic goal, and, that the individual will, through
a self-directed inference process, come to believe that his actions
are the result of external contingencies as opposed to his intrinsic
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interest in the activity (Lepper et al., 1973). Intrinsic interest
mentioned above has been inferred from an indicator: amount of
time spent on subsequent performance of the activity, in studies
by Ross, Deci, Calder & Staw, and Lepper and his colleagues.
Studies by Kruglanski et al
.
(1971, 1975) and Goodman and Friedman
(1969), using other indicators of intrinsic motivation, have seen
intrinsic interest as the factor under study and not merely amount
of time spent. As noted earlier, there have been problems with
the concept of intrinsic motivation. This paper sees perceived
locus of causality as the critical factor, i.e., whether an indivi-
dual sees himself as intrinsically or extrinsical ly motivated.
Operationally, we are interested in whether rewards, as response
contingencies, can alter the duration of a particular behavior
despite that behavior's not having been rewarded previously.
Simply stated, the thesis is this: That the deferred negative
effects of rewards on behavior will generalize. Given a certain
class of activities (high base-rate) for which the overjustification
effect is valid, if some of these activities are rewarded, then
other activities which are similar to these rewarded activities
will be performed for less time than if the rewarded activities
had not been rewarded. If it can be shown that the overjustification
effect generalizes, then to the extent that duration of time spent
on an activity is an indicator of how likely an individual is
to learn while performing that activity, we will have shown that
we can negatively affect the learning process by rewarding certain
behaviors.
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This is a simplified example: if rewarding individuals for
reading adventure story books (an enjoyable, or high base-rate
activity) negatively affects the amount of time spent reading
books concerned with American history, then we are negatively
affecting the amount of history the individual learns.
Methodological issues
. To examine the hypothesis that the over-
justification effect generalizes, an experiment was designed to
compare groups whose performance of an activity follows reward
of similar activities to groups not rewarded for performance of
similar activities. Activities used were novel and interesting
to the subjects. Rewards were salient (Ross, 1975), inmediate
(Ross, 1976), contingent (Deci, 1972a, 1972b, 1975), and equitable
(Deci, 1972a, 1972b). To maximize generalization, trials were
made proximate in time (Walker, 1969), constancy of physical
location (Walker, 1969), type of reward (Kruglanski, 1971; Lepper,
Greene & Nisbett, 1973; Lepper and Greene, 1975), and individual
providing the reward.
Behavioral contingency relations in daily life are so complex
and occur with such regularity, that attempting to alter or
isolate a particular sequence of behaviors will be subject to
contamination by everyday reward procedures. A decision to use
the more artificial individual testing was made because of the
expected relative loss of treatment (reward) strength when so many
other behaviors are present in the stream of behavior. Individual
testing constitutes a high reactive arrangement. The obvious
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connection between treatment and post-testing provides another
source of reactivity. Nevertheless, the superior internal
validity achievable in an individual treatment process, due to
more complete control, outweighs the merits of external generaliz-
ability concomitant with a less reactive method. (See Orne, 1962;
Weick, 1976b for advantages of field studies)
Reiss and Sushinsky (1975) identified a critical difference
between the overjustification hypothesis and the competing response
hypothesis as whether or not decreased play effects are stimulus
novelty effects which would not be associated with multiple trial
contingent reinforcement procedures. Reiss and Sushinsky predicted
that with repeated trials, initial excitement at introduction of
reward would subside, that multiple-trial contingent-reinforce-
ment procedures would not elicit responses which would interfere
with rewarded behavior, and that decreased play effects would not
occur under such reinforcement procedures.
The experiment designed examines the extent to which over-
justification effects generalize to other activities. It also
examines the merits of Reiss and Sushi nsky's competing response
hypothesis predictions in relation to high base-rate activity.
To investigate and control for stimulus novelty predictions:
1) a criterion activity was used which had not been previously
rewarded, 2) more than one rewarded trial was used, 3) a comparison
of two control groups gave an indication of the effects of stimulus
novelty in the experimental situation. 4) Rewards were chosen
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subjectively and, on the basis of previous research, to provide
minimal cognitive and visual interference while remaining salient
enough to produce the cognition in subjects that they were perform-
ing the play activity "in order to" obtain the reward.
Rewards here are provided immediately upon completion of
the activity. Research investigating frustrative delay of reward
involves a delay from promise of reward to provision, as opposed
to delay from completion of activity to provision of reward.
Frustrative delay would most likely be greater at provision of
reward for low base-rate activities, since subjects in high base-
rate activities are already engaging in the activity they might
be expected to prefer--the activity as opposed to the reward.
Staw (1976, p. 15) had observed that, although studies by
Deci and Lepper & Greene support that expectation of reward can
decrease intrinsic motivation in the activity, a source of ambiguity
involves whether the decrease in intrinsic motivation is a result
of administration of or withdrawal of reward. Research by
Kruglanski et al
.
(1971) avoids this ambiguity in that reward is
never withdrawn from experimental subjects in the experimental
group. A frustration effect is thus not adequate to explain
these results. Ross (1976), in research described earlier,
investigates a frustrative delay hypothesis and finds it wanting.
Reiss and Sushinsky criticize the overjustification research
for making intrinsic motivation a function of the intrinsic interest
in other activities available in the free play situation. In the
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experiment designed for this paper, this factor will be partially
controlled, since only one activity was provided at criterion in
the experimental situation. Time spent at criterion could, how-
ever, be considered a function of the interest in regular class-
room procedures including activities which the subject left or
anticipated upon his return to class.
Another criticism of the overjustif ication literature concerns
Reiss and Sushinsky (1976) and Feingold and Mahoney's (1975)
contention that had a reinforcement effect been induced, no decre-
ment would have occurred. Note that in this experiment, demonstra-
tion of a reinforcement effect would have been dependent upon the
extent of generalization from reward procedures, since the criterion
activity has not been rewarded previously. Stated another way,
no reinforcement effect would occur on the criterion activity,
since it had not been rewarded (reinforced). Reinforcement effects
would depend on the extent to which effects of reward procedures had
generalized from treatment to criterion activities. Observe that
demonstration of a reinforcement effect becomes progressively
difficult as a behavior's base-rate increases. Jung (1968) notes
that in verbal learning experiments motivation is of such a level
that other factors cannot be expected to increase level of
performance. Most of the studies described in the preceding
chapter used duration of the rewarded activity subsequent to reward
as a criterion.
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Experimental design
. The experimental design was patterned after
the Solomon (1949) four group design (Campbell and Stanley, 1963).
Nursery school children were randomly assigned to four groups.
Group one (El) played with four different activities, to be
described later. Duration of the first activity was measured
for possible future comparison with replications of the experi-
ment. Activities two and three were rewarded contingent upon
their performance. Activity four was unrewarded, but was again
measured as to its duration. Activity four served as the criterion
activity. Duration of activity has been interpreted as an
indicator of intrinsic motivation or interest in an activity.
Group two (Cl) performed the same four activities as group one.
Again, trials one and four were measured as to duration. But in
group two, which served as a control for group one, rewards were
not provided upon performance of activities two and three, nor
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for activities one or four. Group three did not perform activity
one. It served as a control for effects of pretesting in group
one. Activities two, three and four were performed by group
three; two and three were rewarded contingently upon their
performances as in group one. Activity four was unrewarded, as
in all groups, but was measured as to duration, again, as in all
groups. Group four performed and was measured on only activity
four. It served as a control for the effects of experimental
treatment in group three and for unrewarded performance of activities
two and three in group two.
By comparing activity four for groups four and two, one can
estimate the effects of prior unrewarded trials on performance of
an activity. By comparing activity four, group four with activity
four, group two, we can determine what effect progressive familiarity
with the experimental setting has on results. Subjects in group
two had been in the experiemental setting three times previous to
their performance trial on activity four. Subjects in group four
were entering the experimental setting for the first time. If
progressive familiarity with the experimental setting were a factor,
differential results for groups two and four should be expected.
One might also expect that the less the effect of the experimental
setting, the more externally general izable the results. Findings
that no differences exist could lead one to question hypotheses
involving stimulus novelty effects on an explanation of over-
justification effects.
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Stimulus novelty effects, if they are a factor, can be expected to
occur not only for the reward in the experiment but also for
introduction of other novel stimuli, including the activities
serving as rewarded responses in this experiment. Thus, if
stimulus novelty effects interfere with behavior, as Reiss and
Sushinsky suggest, one might expect a comparison of control group
one to control group two would clarify the relationship. Since
control group one is participating at criterion in an activity for
the fourth time and control group two participating for the first
time, the competing response hypothesis would predict that subjects
in group one would spend longer at the task due to ebbing of
interference associated with novel stimuli.
In summary, the experiment was designed to study the effects
of generalization of reward-effects while avoiding major problems
with the overjustification literature to date. Perceptual and
cognitive distractions, including excitement in anticipation of
reward and frustration resulting from delay or withdrawal of
reward, were to be minimized. This was accomplished on a subjective
basis and amounted to choosing a reward which was not of such
great significance to the subjects as to induce frustration at
removal or excitement in anticipation. Perceptual distraction
was avoided by placing the reward out of sight.
Criterion activities had not been performed by the subjects
prior to their measured performance. This procedure avoids problems
relating to satiation and differential skill levels between reward
and control groups as a result of practice. Use of a previously
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unintroduced activity disarms criticisms relating to Rice's
observation on interest in previously solved puzzles. Since this
procedure avoided association of reward with criterion, criticisms
relating to interference with activity by reward would not be
expected to apply since activity had not yet been performed and
could thus not have been interfered with.
An explanation of these results in terms of interference is
made more difficult by the choice of reward similar to typical
reward procedures used with nursery school children. One might
expect that their novelty as stimuli, and hence interfering cap-
abilities, would not be great since they are analogous to typical
classroom procedures.
Certain advantages ensue as a result of using the Solomon-
four group design including 1 ) an opportunity to i nvestigate stimul us
novelty effects, and 2 ) a replication of treatment effects.
Campbell and Stanley (1963) state that the actual instabilities of
experimentation are such that "if these comparisons, 0
^
> 0
^,
O
2 >
O4 , are in agreement,
the strength of the inference is...
increased" (p. 24).
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Where 0 is observation
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The Solomon is intended for use where each observation is based
on the same instrument. In that case, 0
4
could be compared to
0
3
and 0
2
could be compared to 0
^
greatly increasing the strength
of the inference. In this study, and O
3
consist of a different
activity from observations 2, 4, 5, and 6
,
and hence observations
4 & 3 and 2 & 1 cannot be directly compared. Campbell and Stanley
suggest (p. 25) that a 2x2 analysis of variance is the appropriate
statistic to examine results of the experiment performed in
accordance with this design. Only post-test scores are examined
(for Observations 2
, 4, 5, and 6 ), with pre-test scores being
disregarded in the ANOVA. A pretest vs. no pretest factor would
be crossed with a reward vs. no-reward factor.
Diagramatical 1 y
:
No Reward Reward Each observation
(control
)
(experimental
)
represents time
pretested °4 °2
spent on activity 4
unpretested
°6 °5
FIGURE 3: ANOVA representation of reward by pretest factors
With the addition of an experimenter factor we are left with a
2x2x2 ANOVA, completely crossed.
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Analysis of the data was performed using a three way ANOVA. The
three factors were: 1) reward vs. no reward (groups one and three
compared to groups two and four), 2) pretesting vs. no pretesting
(groups one and two versus groups three and four), and 3) Experi-
menter One versus Experimenter Two.
Experiment Two was similar to Experiment One with the following
exceptions: only one experimenter was used in Experiment Two and
Activity Two was replaced by an activity more similar to the
criterion activity than the second activity in Experiment One.
Use of one experimenter in Experiment Two enabled dropping a factor
in the ANOVA, leaving a 2x2 ANOVA examining a pre-test vs. no
pre-test factor crossed with a reward vs. a control group factor.
Results of Experiment Two are compared non-statistical ly with
those of Experiment One.
Experimenter and subjects . Only one experimenter was used at the
beginning of the experiment. Time restrictions imposed by one
of the nursery school directors would have resulted in the testing
of only eight subjects per week. Any further complications would
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have necessitated enlisting the cooperation of different schools
or postponing completion of the study for months. Research by
Reiss and Sushinsky (1975) had indicated "results were not a
function of the experimenter's personality." Cascio and Krusell
(1973) used a male and female experimenter "so that it would be
possible to separate the effects of an interaction between the
sex of the experimenter and the sex of the subjects." 1 No inter-
action was found.
On the basis of findings of these two studies and the absence
of reported experimenter effects in the overjustification literature,
no significant experimenter effects were anticipated. An experi-
menter factor was included in the analysis to control for variation
(Hays, 1973). Two male experimenters were used. The addition
of a second experimenter to the investigation, coupled with easy
access to another school and more time provided by the director
of the first school, made possible the collection of data which
serve to replicate the findings of the first experiment while
lending some support to a derivative of the original hypothesis:
that a direct relationship exists between similarity of rewarded
activities and the degree of generalization of the effects.
Examination of the literature revealed that findings of
interaction of sex effects with reward were limited to a Deci
et al. (1973) and Deci et al . (1972b) study using college students.
1 Since only one experimenter of each sex was used, findings
of sex-interaction would have been confounded with between-expen-
menter effects.
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The following studies do not report information on sex differences:
Deci, 1971, 1972b; Deci, Benware and Landy, 1974; and Kruglanski,
1975a, 1975b. Deci (1972a) found a sex by verbal reinforcement
interaction. Verbal reinforcement increased males' intrinsic
motivation while leaving females' unchanged, while males receiving
no verbal reinforcement spent less time on puzzles than females.
The sex by verbal reinforcement treatment approached significance
(
p=
. 13 ) . Deci, Cascio and Krusell (1973) found that female
subjects who received positive feedback spent less free-choice
time working on puzzles than those who got no feedback. Positive
feedback increased the intrinsic motivation of males. Deci (1975)
interprets as follows:
For females, the change in perceived locus of causality
process was initiated, whereas for males the change in
feelings of competence and self-determination was
initiated. This implies that the controlling aspect
of positive feedback is more salient for females than
the informational aspect, whereas for males the infor-
mational aspect is more sal ient. . .Girls are taught to
be more dependent than boys. Frequently girls, and
subsequently, women, define themselves in terms of
men. Women will be more likely to become dependent
on the positive feedback from the experimenter .. .Men
are socialized to be more independent and less dependent
on feedback. Consequently they are less likely to
perceive that they are engaging in the activity for the
verbal reward and more likely to perceive the feedback
as information about their competence, (pp. 145-146)
Deci (1973) reports finding an increase for males' intrinsic
motivation following reward in Deci 1971, but this author could
find no such difference reported.
Calder and Staw (1975) used only male subjects. Ross found
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a main effect for sex on a drum activity but found no interaction.
(Males spent about twice as much time playing drums as did females.)
Lepper and Greene (1975, p. 483), Lepper et al
.
(1973, p. 134) and
Greene and Lepper (1974, p. 1142) found no sex effects in pretesting
in nursery school children using tangible rewards. Analysis of the
research presented above reveals that verbal reinforcement has
produced differential sex effects, and that tangible reinforcement
has not. Deci used college students as subjects while Lepper and
his colleagues used nursery school students. Since sex effects
had been obtained only in experiments using college students, and
there using verbal feedback, and this experiment used nursery school
children with a tangible reward procedure, sex effects were not
included in the ANOVA.
Subjects in the experiment were boys and girls from 42 to
82 months, with an X = 61.5. Children were chosen randomly from
three St. Paul, Minnesota day-care centers. The experimental setting
in each case consisted of a large room in the same building as
the subjects' normal classroom. Subjects were treated and tested
individually. They were escorted by the experimenter from their
class room to the testing room. After Ross (1975), experimenters
were unaware of the experiment's purpose.
Subjects were seated at small desks in each case, with the
prospective activity displayed on the desk. The experimenter
sat at least ten feet to the side of the subjects and at least
six feet to the rear of an imaginary line drawn through the subject's
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shoulders. The experimenter had in his possession a book which
he proceeded to read after explaining the procedure to the
subjects and telling them that he would be reading. The experi-
menter was instructed to observe the subject's behavior as
unobtrusively as possible, this to minimize the effects of
surveillance (Lepper & Greene, 1975) and to avoid distraction.
It was anticipated that if subjects' activities were
terminated by the experimenter, subjects would learn to expect
that the experimenter would terminate further activities, including
the final, measured activity. It was further expected that this
anticipation of interference could have an extending effect on
the amount of time involved, since subjects would wait until the
experimenter terminated the activity and thus avoid terminating
the activity themselves. Consequently, activities one, three
and four had to be altered so as to conform to the time limits.
(Activity Two needed no paring because of its unique interrupted
nature, or possibly because it was not as interesting to the
subjects as the other activities.) These time limits were
instituted to provide a modicum of predictabl i ty as to the amounts
of time needed to complete each four-subject segment of the
experiment. The experiment had been broken into four-subject
segments to insure that the post-tests would follow the training
sessions after approximately the same length of time for each
subject, thus minimizing variablity due to differential lengths
of time between training and post-test.
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Four activities were used in Experiment One: a magic marker
activity, a drum and record activity, a puzzle activity, and a
matching same or different activity. Lepper et al
.
(1973) had
used a magic marker activity in their analysis of the over-
justification effect. Pretesting in this situation revealed
that subjects, when presented with a complete magic marker set
of 24 markers and unlimited paper supply, would go on drawing
with the markers for lengths of time surpassing half an hour.
No subject was permitted to play more than half an hour, so an
upper limit was not possible to determine. Since the original
design involved four trials for each of forty children and later
involved sixty children, a time limit had to be imposed on the
activity. Previous research has used percentage of a five minute
trial period. It was arbitrarily decided here to use a six
minute limit for the final trial and a five minute limit on
pretesting and training trials. Since subjects had a tendency to
use each of the magic markers in the set while drawing, one way
to reduce time spent was to limit the number of magic markers
available. The number was gradually reduced until most subjects
were finishing their activity within a five minute limit. Activity
One consisted of two magic markers and a sheaf of five pages of
paper. More paper was provided if requested, but more magic
markers were not provided.
Ross (1975) used a drum on which subjects accompanied a record
as a target activity to investigate the effects of salience of
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reward on intrinsic motivation. The phonograph record which
subjects accompanied as Activity Two was entitled "Songs from
Walt Disney's The Jungle Book and Other Jungle Favorites." There
were separate songs on the side of the record which was used in
the experiment (side 1). Since the period between songs provided
a natural hiatus, most of the subjects took advantage of the
opportunity to terminate the activity upon conclusion of one of
the songs. The drum activity further consisted of a stick 1/8"
stick 8" long attached to a 3/4" diameter wooden ball, as well
as two wooden drums, one 4" in diameter and another 3" in diameter,
both 5" high. The drums were secured to one another by a large
wooden peg.
Activity Three consisted of a commercially marketed toy.
Deci (1971) used soma puzzles in his experiments with college
students when investigating the effects of rewards on intrinsically
motivated behavior. Calder and Staw (1975) used puzzles which
they developed for their experiments with college students.
Lacking expertise on the types of puzzles nursery school children
would find interesting, this investigator procured a commerically
marketed puzzle. This puzzle consisted of 3" in diameter by
1/8" thick scalloped circular pieces of crepe foam rubber from
which were cut shapes such as squares, hearts, circles, triangles,
and stars. There were approximately four pieces to each puzzle.
The name of the toy was "Fi t-a-space, " marketed by Lauri Enter-
prises of Phil 1 i ps-Avon, Maine. As in the magic marker activity,
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subjects tended to want to manipulate each item. To avoid as
much as possible the termination of the activity by the experi-
menter, the activity was pared from sixteen to three circular
puzzles. Completion of a puzzle provided a natural hiatus at
which subjects frequently chose to stop the activity.
Activity Four was again a commercially marketed toy, this
time purchased by the investigator on the basis of a subjective
initial judgment as to its similarity in interest level and
difficulty to the other activities. This judgment was confirmed
by a nursery school teacher and two experienced children's store
employees. It is called "Wipe-off Cards, Finding Pairs," and
it is marketed by Trend Enterprises, Inc. It consists of 8 1/2"
by 11" pieces of plastic upon which are two columns of line
drawings of animals, people, household items, etc. The pairs
to the five drawings in column one can, in each case, be found
among the drawings in column two, with the object ostensibly to
draw lines between the pairs. Subjects were given three sheets
of this activity and were provided additional sheets if they
requested them.
Experiment Two was identical to Experiment One with the
following exceptions: only twenty subjects were used; only one
experimenter was used; and the drum activity was replaced by
another wipe-off-cards activity put out by Trend Enterprises,
Inc., chosen in the same manner as Activity Four. This activity
was called "Same or Different." It consisted of 12 sheets, each
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of which had four rows of line drawings. In a column on the left
were four different drawings. In each row were two similar
drawings and one dissimilar (different condition) or two dissimilar
and one similar (same condition). Subjects were given three such
sheets and provided with additional sheets upon request until
they stopped of their own accord or until, in a few cases, a five
minute limit was reached.
Rewards were modeled after those of Lepper and Greene (1973)
and consisted of 5" x 7" plastic cards, bright orange in color,
upon which was pasted a 1 1/2" blue foil star from which emanated
two 2 1/2" long pieces of 1/2" blue ribbon. Harter and Zigler
(1972) had found these awards to be effective rewards. This
arrangement occupied approximately the left third of the card.
On the bottom one third of the remaining two thirds of the card
was printed GOOD PLAYER AWARD in 1/2" letters. The upper right
corner of the card was reserved for the subject's name, written
in water-soluble marker, with a flourish, upon completion of the
activity. Good player awards were displayed on shelves to the
side and rear of subjects, again to minimize distraction. Subjects
were not observed to scrutinize the awards. Awards were removed
from display for non-rewarded groups and for those reward group
trials where reward was not administered.
The following instructions were given to subjects:
Pre-room :
A man has come to your school for a few days to find
out
some things about how children play.
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Non-reward group : Would you like to come to another room
and play for a short time?
Reward group : You will get a reward if you play for a short
time in the next room. Would you like to come to the room
and win a reward?
In room :
Non-reward group : Here is a (name the toy or activity).
(Show how to use it, do it, what to do.) Why don't you
play with it for a short while.
Reward group : This is a good player award which you will
win if you play with this... Do you want to win this award?
If you do win it, we will place it here on the wall with any
other good player awards, with your name on it. After playing
Here is the good player award I promised. Isn't it nice
and pretty? I'll put your name on it. What's your name?
(Experimenter says child's name and writes it.) Let's put
it up here so everyone can see it.
Reward group--fina1 activity : This time you will not get
any reward for playing. Here is the (puzzle, etc.).
(Experimenter explains how to do it.)
Experimenters were instructed to answer questions the subjects
asked, but not to engage them in conversation. Experimenters
demonstrated how to manipulate each activity until the subject
understood, as evidenced by performance of the activity. Other
activities were hidden before the subject came into the room to
minimize interference. On all but Activity Four experimenters
were instructed to stop the subjects at approximately the five-
minute mark unless the subject had previously stopped. Subjects
were considered to have stopped if they were not touching or
looking directly at the activity for a period of five seconds.
Subjects were to be dismissed from the room if they did not play
with the activity within thirty seconds. That situation did not
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arise. Subjects were then told they had finished the activity,
thanked for their participation and allowed to leave.
Each block of four subjects was treated in the following
order, with subject one representing experimental group one,
subject two control group one, subject three experimental group
two, and subject four control group two: subject one performs
activity one, subject two performs activity one, subject one
performs activity two, subject two activity two, subject three
activity two. . .subject four activity four. The following visual
representation will aid in understanding the procedure.
Activity
pretest, experimental
pretest, control
unpretested, experimental
unpretested, control
end
FIGURE 5: Subject and activity order
Each group of four subjects began and completed testing within a
three-hour period of time.
Approximately one week after completion of the testing, the
experimenter returned to the schools, explained the experiment
and results to the teacher and students. A written description
was provided the teachers for their own use and for presentation
to interested parents.
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Future research
. One of the difficulties involved in examining
play among children is how to induce them to engage in the
activity. It is easy to confound duration of activity with
engagement in the activity. Specifically, as noted by Reiss and
Sushinsky (1975, 1976), the need to coax a child to engage in an
activity can cast serious doubt on how intrinsically motivating
that activity is for that child. Orne (1962) refers to this as
one of the demand characteristics of the situation. It is not
mandatory to the hypothesis under study that the activities used
be of intrinsic interest to the subjects. In fact, it would
heighten the general izabi 1 i ty of the results were one to determine
that the base-rate of the behavior under study was lower than
what is supposed, since behaviors less intrinsically interesting
than previously supposed would thus be subject to overjustification
effects. If one's inferences are clearly related to factors
dependent on duration of activity as opposed to the dichotomous
question of engaging in the activity or not engaging in it, this
methodological problem diminishes in significance.
CHAPTER I V
RESULTS
The hypothesis that subjects rewarded for high base-rate
activities would subsequently spend less time at those high base-
rate activities than controls was investigated. High base-rate
activities were in this case operationalized as novel, play
activities. Two experiments were performed. Experiment One varied
pretest versus no pretest X experimenter A versus B X reward versus
no-reward (control) conditions. Specifically the null hypothesis
was tested. H
q
: no differences will be found in duration of
play activity between subjects previously rewarded and those not
previously rewarded for performing activities similar to the
criterion activity. H^: previously rewarded subjects will spend
less time at subsequent play activities which are similar to
previously rewarded activities as compared to unrewarded subjects.
The experimenter factor was included to control for variance rather
than on any theoretical grounds (Hays, 1973).
An analysis of Experiment One was performed using a three-way
fixed effects ANOVA, with replication and with proportional cell
frequencies. Computational formulas for this procedure are found
by combining procedures for proportional cell frequencies (Winer,
1971, p. 422) with procedures for performing a three-way ANOVA
with replication (Winer, p. 459). Results of Experiment One are
presented in Appendix A.
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Experiment Two varied pretesting versus no-pretesting factors
X reward versus control factors. Experiment Two analysis involved
a two-way fixed effects model with replication. Data for Experiment
Two are presented in Appendix B.
Experiment Two differed from Experiment One in that the first
rewarded activity was altered so that it would be more similar to
the final, criterion activity than the first rewarded activity,
the drum activity, in Experiment One. Also, the time limit was
increased from 6 minutes in Experiment One to 12 1/2 minutes for
Experiment Two, since a ceiling or damping effect was noticed in
Experiment One. This ceiling effect was more noticeable for
experimenter B, with only three subjects reaching the limit of six
minutes for experimenter A, including the pretesting scores. Prior
testing employed to set limits had been conducted only with experi-
menter A.
In both experiments time was measured to the nearest five
second mark. Data were then reduced to number of five second
segments which the subject completed. Data represented in Appendices
A and B are time in five second segments.
Experiment One . Data for Experiment One are presented in Table
One as mean proportions of the six-minute experimental period
during which children played with the criterion activity.
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Reward
Pretest
Reward
Unpretested
No Reward
Pretest
No Reward
Unpretested
Experimenter A
.338
.303
.317
.586
Experimenter B .521 .715
.801
.872
Table 1: Experiment One: Mean proportions of 6 Minute
Experimental Period S's played with Criterion
Activity, by Treatment
Table Two represents the same data with the experimenter factor
pooled.
Reward No Reward
Pretested
.411 .513
Unpretested .443 .700
Table 2: Experiment One: Mean Proportion of 6 Minute
Experimental Period S's played with Criterion
Activity, by Treatment, with Experimenter
Factor Pooled.
Table Three represents the same data with both pretesting and
experimenter factors pooled.
Reward No Reward
.427 .606
Table 3: Experiment One: Mean Proportion of 6 Minute
Experimental Period S's played with Criterion
Activity, by Treatment, with Pretesting Factor
and Experimenter Factor Pooled.
As predicted, children spent less time on a criterion activity
after reward.
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Transformation on data. Winer (1971) states that moderate departures
from the assumption of homogeneity of error variance do not seriously
effect the sampling distribution of the resulting F statistic, but
that the greater the skewness in the distribution of the population
variances, the more bias in the resulting test (p. 205). Olds
(1954) calls for the use of transformations to meet the assumptions
of the ANOVA, including constancy of variance, normality of distri-
bution and additivity of effects (p. 5) "A priori theory and experi-
ence.
. .determines the appropriate scale (of measurement) . " Winer
(1971) states that "the logarithmic transformation is particularly
effective in normalizing distributions which have positive skewness"
(p. 400). (A transformation is a change in the scale of measurement
for the criterion.)
Greene and Lepper (1974), in a study measuring percentage of
free choice time subjects spent on a task, used the transformation
Y‘ = log
e
(Y+l) to obtain more homogeneous treatment variances.
Lepper and Greene (1973) used the same transformation to analyze
data representing the proportion of time subjects spent on previously
rewarded activities in expected versus non-expected and no reward
conditions. Ross (1975) used a natural log transformation on data
representing duration of contact with a drum (possible range 0-300
seconds) since a preliminary examination of his data revealed
skewness. Calder and Staw (1975) use a natural log transformation
"since the distribution of time scores tends to be skewed" (p. 603).
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As seen by the following graph, data for Experiment One is
positively skewed.
Time Spent at Activity
FIGURE 6: Graph of number of subjects by time spent at activity
On the basis of 1) precedent for the use of transformations in the
analysis of data very similar to those of this experiment (as
documented above, 2) the positive skew to the data, and 3) to
minimize the effects of lack of homogeneity of error variance, a
transformation is employed on the data of this experiment.
Winer (1971) states that since in many practical cases the
range tends to be proportional to the variance, we choose trans-
formations based on estimates from the range. A transformation
which makes the ranges more uniform will also make the variances
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more uniform, (4. 401). He presents the truncated range statistic
for use in deciding between transformations. Data for this statistic
are represented in Appendix C. It shows that the natural logarithm
transformation Y' = log
e
(Y+l) yields the smallest ratio of
differences between ranges. Consequently, on the basis of the
positive skewness of the data and the results of the truncated
range statistic, the transformation Y' = log
e
(Y+l) is used for
analysis of this data. A table showing both untransformed propor-
tion of the experimental 6 minute interval and transformations of
these data are presented as Appendix D. Computational formulas and
summary tables for Experiment One are presented in Appendix E.
Results of the analysis of variance are presented in Table 4. Means
for these data are represented in Tables 5, 6, and 7 as mean number
of 5 second segments subjects spent at the activities.
df SV SS Ms F
1 Experimenter .431 .431 16.58**
1 Pretest .050 .050 1.92
1 Reward .118 .118 4.54*
1
Experimenter X
Pretest .001 .001 .04
1
Experimenter X
Reward .011 .011 .42
1
Pretest X
Reward .025 .025 .96
1
Experimenter X
Pretest X Reward .041 .041 1.58
32 Within cell .832 .026
39
Tabl e
Total
4: ANOVA Summary for
1.509
F.99 (1,32)
F .95 (1,32)
= 7.51
= 4.15
Experiment One
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Main effects for reward are significant at the .05 level of signifi-
cance supporting the hypothesis that previously rewarded subjects
spent less time at criterion activity than controls. A strong
main effect for experimenter was also noteworthy.
Reward Reward Unrewarded Unrewarded
Pretest Unpretest Pretested Unpretested
E
1
E
2
C
2
Experimenter A 24.33 21.83 22.83 42.167
Experimenter B 37.5 51.5 58 62 75
Table 5: Experiment One: Mean criterion time in
5-second segments. Experimenter X
reward condition.
Reward No Reward
E C
Experimenter A 23.08 32.50
Experimenter B 44.5 60.25
Table 6: Experiment One: Data in 5-second segments.
Collapsed across pretesting dimension.
Reward
E
33.79
No Reward
C
46.38
Table 7: Experiment One: Data collapsed across
experimenter and pretesting dimensions.
Experimenter effect . It is suggested that a combination of surveil-
lance, personality, and/or weather factors accounted for the
between-experimenter effect. Experimenter A started before
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Experimenter B and was testing on those spring days when warm
weather had just begun. Children were reluctant to come indoors
to participate in the experiment and eager to return to the out-
doors. Experimenter B began testing after cold temperatures
returned. Opportunities to observe the experimenters at work were
presented in schools one and three. School one had doors through
which conversation could be heard, and school three had a door
with a window through which one could listen and watch unobtrusively.
Subjects appeared to be more comfortable with Experimenter B.
Another possible explanation encompassing both the non-significant
three-way interaction and the general brevity of all trials for
Experimenter A involves his surveillance of the subjects. Experi-
menter A observed subjects very closely. Lepper and Greene's
(1976) study on the effects of surveillance indicates that surveil-
lance has much the same effect on duration of activity as reward.
Surveillance seems to inhibit play. Thus, the low score in Table
5 - Cl for Experimenter A could be a function of differential
prior surveillance for Cl as opposed to C2. Cl had been in the
experimental setting three times earlier. C2 would not be subject
to the surveillance effect as strongly, since subjects in C2
had not had prior trials of observed play. That is, 1) subjects
perceived the surveillance more readily as a result of more opportu-
nities to observe this surveillance, and 2) subjects perceived the
surveillance effect more readily for Experimenter A as opposed to
Experimenter B, since Experimenter A surveyed their behavior more
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closely and obviously than Experiment B.
It was emphasized that no significant three-way interaction
was found. Despite the apparent disparity of score Cl for Experi-
menter A, much of the disparity might be a result of a highly
variable criterion. That is, significance was not found due to
the great degree of variability on the criterion throughout the
experiment. Effects were not found for interaction between experi-
menter and treatment condition. Such findings would have suggested
that some rewarders have a stronger inhabitory effect on subsequent
play activity than other rewarders. This findings of lack of
interaction is consistent with work by Deci et al. (1973).
By comparing the C2 score with the Cl score, one can get an
impression of the effects of the experimental situation on relative
performance (duration). Analysis of results shows an overall lack
of significance for main effects or interaction. No statistically
reliable differences were found. However, a tendency for subjects
to spend more time in the C2 condition, repeated in Experiment Two,
would bear investigation.
It could be argued that the smaller amount of time subjects
spent in Cl was due to prior surveillance at pre-test and control
treatments one and two. In future research it would be desirable
to unconfound surveillance and familiarity with experimental setting
effects.
Experiment Two . The natural log transformation Y' = loge (Y+l)
was used for reasons similar to the reasons for its use in Experiment
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One, as well as to make results of the two experiments more
comparabl e. Results of the ANOVA for Experiment Two are presented
in Table 8. Computation appears in Appendix F. Formulas used are
from Hays (1973).
SV df SS Ms F
Pretest - no pretest (C) 1 .009
.009
.533
Reward - no reward (R) l .691
.691 40.89*
R x C 1 .004
.004 .237
Error 16 .271 .0169
Total 19 .974
Table 8: ANOVA results for Experiment Two with y = k/150.
Comparison of Experiment One to Experiment Two is not directly
possible with this ANOVA for two reasons: 1) a significant
experimenter factor in Experiment One would make a comparison
confusing (however, a comparison of means for Experimenter B within
Experiment One with means for Experiment Two where Experimenter B
was the only experimenter would be possible), and 2) data for
Experiment Two should be adjusted so that proportion of time spent
is based on an experimental period of six minutes as in Experiment
One. In Experiment One the proportion of time spent on a task
was x/72, while in Experiment Two it was x/150. Thus the same
absolute time spent in Experiment One would represent different
proportions in Experiment One and Two. Data for Experiment Two
were subjected to a second Analysis of Variance where y = x/72, as
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in Experiment One, for purposes of rough comparison. Computation
is shown in Appendix H. Table 9 summarizes the results.
S V df SS Ms F
Pretest - no pretest C 1 .013
.013
.325
Reward - no reward R 1 .566
.566 14.15*
C x R 1 .000 0 0
•, Error 16 .639
.040
Total 19 1.218
*F. 99 ( 1 , 16 ) = 8.53
Table 9: ANOVA results for Experiment Two with y * x/72
Transforma tion of the scores to original proportion denominator
makes the comparison more meaningful. No reliable conclusion can
be drawn on the basis of this comparison because of the experimenter
factor effects in Experiment One. Means of proportions of criterion
activity period used by subjects for Experimenter B within Experiment
One and for Experiment Two are presented in Table 10.
Experimenter B
from Expertmei
Experimenter B
E
i
E
2
c
i
C
2
E
i
E
2
c
i
C
2
. 37.5 51.5 58 62.75 .521 .715 .806 .872
2
27.4 30.4 64.8 72 .381 .472 .900 1.000
By Mean No. of 5- By Proportion
second Segments
Table 10: Mean No. of 5-second segments and proportion of
time spent at criterion activity for Experimenter
B in Experiment 1 and 2, by treatment with y = x/72.
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Subjects spent more time playing at criterion while with Experi-
menter B in Experiment One than in Experiment Two. In Experiment
One, activities were less similar to criterion activities than in
Experiment Two. In Experiment One rewarded subjects spent approxi-
mately 62% of time playing while in Experiment Two spent only
about 29%. It is this comparison of Experimenter B in Experiment
One and Experimenter B in Experiment Two that supports the hypothesis
that the more similar the rewarded activities, the stronger the
inhibition of play on a subsequent criterion. Time spent on a
subsequent activity and similarity of activity seem to vary inversely.
This is not based on a statistical procedure analyzing the scores,
but upon inspection of means. This comparison is for purposes of
examining the relative effects of more and less similar treatments
to criterion activities. Comparing rewarded groups for Experiments
One and Two shows a stronger treatment effect for Experiment Two
than Experiment One. Data as analyzed in Experiment Two, ANOVA
number one, more closely resemble the true state of affairs, while
data in Experiment Two, ANOVA number two, are more comparable to
the data of Experiment One.
By comparing data in Table 10, represented as pooled by
pretest factor in Table 11, we see that when treatment (rewarded)
activities are more similar to the criterion activity, the duration
of play activities diminishes.
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Experimenter B,
Experiment 1
Experimenter B,
Experiment 2
Table 11:
E C Y1
44.5 60.38 £O
</>
28.9 68.4 1
ro3
c+
E C -o
.618
.839 o
T3O
3
.401 .950 o
Mean No. of 5-second segments and proportion of
time spent at criterion activity for Experimenter
B with pretesting factor pooled, with y = x/72.
Assuming the amount of time spent on activities to be a
relative constant within groups across trials (or different
activities), inspection of control means tends to corroborate
interpretation of an inverse relationship between 1) similarity of
rewarded to criterion activity and 2) amount of time spent on that
subsequent criterion activity. The more similar are reward to
criterion activities the less time will be spent at criterion.
Sex effects
. After data were analyzed, differential sex effects
were investigated for subjects in experimental conditions. Specifi-
cally, the following hypothesis was investigated: that no
differences existed in duration of criterion activity times between
male and female subjects in the rewarded conditions pooled. A
t-test was performed using formulas in Underwood (1954). The null
hypothesis was not rejected: t (l-a=.95) = 2.03 with 28 df.
Appendix G contains statistical procedures and formulas. Since
the critical value for a t of 28 df = 2.05, we see that the critical
value was quite close to the observed value, thus leaving open to
some question the conclusions that male and female subjects did
not differ. Males spent less time at criterion, following the
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rewarded activity than did females. Inspection of means as
presented in Table 12 reveals that control males and control
females differed by only approximately three units, tending to
cast doubt on hypotheses predicting differences in treatment
conditions (rewarded conditions) between sexes as being due to
main effects of sex as opposed to interaction effects. Further
study of differential sex effects should be made, especially since
differences between sexes tended here to be in the opposite direction
from that which Deci et al
.
(1973) found for verbal feedback
conditions among college students.
E
1
E
2
C
1
C
2
Male 24.13 24.00 46.67 61.71
Female 34.28 36.33 45.5 54
E C
Male 24.07 53.25
Female 35.43 50.36
Table 12: Mean treatment effects x sex for data
pooled across Experiment 1 & 2.
Nature of the decrement . We might speculate that for each individual
there is a task or tasks at which he might spend a disproportionately
large amount of time in comparison to other tasks in which he engages
and/or in comparison to other individual's time spent at that task
or tasks. In Graph 2 below, depicting the experimental data in
reward versus no reward condition, we see that seven controls spent
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longer periods of time playing at the activities than any of the
rewarded subjects. One might speculate that the use of rewards
decreases the likelihood that an individual will spend dispropor-
tionate amounts of time on an activity, and, in fact, other similar
activities. On the basis of the data presented below, one might
hypothesize that rewarding an individual for high base-rate
behavior does not so much diminish the amount of time each individual
spends at each activity, but rather diminishes or curtails relatively
long term, i.e. persistent or perservering, behavior in certain
circumstances. This speculation is not made as the result of any
statistical procedure, but upon inspection of the data, and should
be viewed with caution.
FIGURE 7: Graph of number of subjects by time
spent at activity.
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Reflection reveals at least two possible explanations.
First, individuals in the experimental group, who are the counter-
parts to individuals in the control group spending the dispropor-
tionate amounts of time, may have had this perserverance at the
activity in question extinguished. Within the experimental group
there is a certain group of individuals who, had they been
unrewarded, would have perservered at Activity Four. The first
possibility is that this group of individuals is relatively
constant as to its individual members, i.e. that the same indivi-
duals regularly spend long periods of time at certain activities.
The second possible explanation is that each individual is highly
variable from one activity to another. For a given activity, any
individual may spend disproportionately larger periods of time.
In either case rewards tend to inhibit perserverance at activities.
Restated, the alternatives are: 1) some individuals consistently
spend long periods of time at most behaviors, others at very few
behaviors, and 2) most individuals spend long periods of time at
some behaviors but not others.
Work by Rotter discussed in Chapter V sees persistence as a
task by an individual as a correlate of internal ity, defined as a
belief in internal control of reinforcement. Decreased persistence
at a task, associated here with reward procedures, would be a
correlate of externality.
CHAPTER V
IMPLICATIONS OF RESEARCH
This paper has shown that rewards can negatively affect per-
formance of high base-rate behavior. Evidence has accrued which
indicates that a cognitive change is assocated with this decrement.
Research was performed for this paper demonstrating the generalization
of overjusti f ication effects. This finding relates to research by
Rotter on Internal ity-External ity, to be discussed later in this
chapter. Practical implications for research described in this
paper are discussed, as are possible means to avoid overjustification
effects, notably self-reinforcement procedures.
The behavior modification literature has addressed the effects
of rewards on behavior. Literature reviewing behavior modification
literature is examined for references to negative effects of
rewards on behavior. Reasons for the general failure of this
literature to report negative effects are posited. The relationship
of behavior modification literature to the overjustification liter-
ature is discussed. Aspects of the behavior modification literature
are studied to determine under what conditions usefulness of behavior
modification procedures outweighs possible negative consequences.
A general lack of demonstrable generalization maintenance effects
in token research would tend to support research documenting under-
mining effects to the extent that tokens are perceived as attempts
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at control by the subjects involved. The perceived locus of
causality literature reviewed in this paper does not dispute
increments in performance during reward and withdrawal procedures,
but does predict deferred negative consequences.
Kazdin and Bootzin (1972) describe stimulus generalization as
the "transfer of effects to other stimulus conditions or situations,"
i.e. "whether behavior change is maintained when there is no
token economy" (p. 359). They refer to response generalization as
the spread of effects to behaviors or responses that were not of
initial focus. Considerable discussion in the literature has been
devoted to the generalization of treatment effects across time
and settings. Levine and Fasnacht (1975) note that the abrupt
termination of reward procedures common upon leaving an institution
where such procedures were used, including schools, hospitals, and
treatment programs, constitutes an extinction paradigm, not a
generalization paradigm. Turkewitz, O'Leary and Ironsmith (1975)
note that although "many of the early classroom token programs
were withdrawn, the behavior change was not maintained" (Birnbrauer
et al., 1965; Kuypers et al
. ,
1968; O'Leary et al
. ,
1969; see also
Gripp and Mazaro, 1974) (p. 577). Similarly, many studies have not
found generalization effects of the token program to time of day
when the program was not in effect (Kuypers et al., 1961; Meichenbaum,
Bowers and Ross, 1968; O'Leary et al., 1969; Wolf, Giles and Hall,
1968). Krasner and Krasner (1973) state that token-induced
behavioral change has not generalized to stimulus conditions not
involving tokens.
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Drabman, Spitalnik and O'Leary (1973) did obtain generalization,
though their process included a maintenance strategy involving
verbal procedures complicating relatively simple reward procedures,
making them less practical (Levine and Fasnacht, 1975). Programmed
maintenance techniques such as fading, intermittent reinforcement
and non-contingent reinforcement are not in general use and will
make procedures more complicated. Levine and Fasnacht note that
behavior modification studies finding generalization specify
substitution of verbal procedures for tokens. They see verbal
procedures as a main as opposed to maintenance strategy.
Behavior modifiers have recognized different effects for
different types of rewards. O'Leary, Drabman and Kass (1973) state,
In former studies maintenance (of appropriate behavior)
was not obtained; but in this study it was and the type
of reward appeared to be the only clear procedural differ-
ence in these studies.. .If one is using an incentive
program it is probably best to offer the smallest reward
possible in order to obtain the desired results. Such a
conclusion might be drawn from a number of different
theoretical positions including both learning theory
(D* Amato, 1971) and attribution theory of social psychology
(Lepper et al., 1973)... A distinction may be made between
natural reinforcers and small reinforcers, .. .the separate
contribution of small magnitude of reward and natural
aspects of the rewards here used could not be assessed.
(p. 136)
O'Leary et al
.
go on to recommend "that whenever possible one use
natural reinforcers and the smallest reinforcers necessary to
produce the desired results." O'Leary and O'Leary (1972) and
O'Leary, Poulos and Devine (1972) recommend the use of minimal
rewards to effect change. Spence (1970) notes:
The performance of elementary school children in a
two-alternative discrimination task has been found to be
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significantly poorer under a reinforcement condition
In which a material reward (candy) was given for each
correct response than under a symbolic reward condition
(
p
P
103)
SP° ken by an ex Per1men ter or a light signal).
Direct Integration of the behavior modification and over-
justification literature was not possible for reasons described
below. The overjustification literature concerns Itself with the
effect of rewards on high base-rate behaviors, while the behavior
modification literature concerns itself with low base-rate behaviors.
However, the overjusti f icatlon literature Is applicable to the
behavior modification literature to the extent that high base-
rate behaviors are Inadvertently reinforced. Inadvertent rein-
forcement would occur, for example, in circumstances where
contingencies are not sufficiently individualized (Bandura, 1974).
It includes cases where target behaviors may be of a high base-
rate for some individuals, and not others, as when rewards are
applied in an across-subjects fashion. The overjustification
literature's relation to the behavior modification literature
merits investigation to determine the extent of undermining effects.
Some of the behavior modification work has been done with
animals. Successive behavior contrast has been investigated
primarily in the animal literature. It is proposed that because
of cognitive factors, the animal literature will not be directly
appl icabl e.
Methodological problems In behavior modi f ir.itinn literature . A
review of methodological problems found in the behavior modification
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literature will reveal further limitations on its applicability to
the overjustification literature. Kazdin and Bootzin (1972) stress
that the use of the ABAB equivalent time-samples design (Campbell
and Stanley, 1963), often used in the behavior modification
literature, is appropriate only when the behavior studied is transient
and reversible. (See also Kazdin, 1973). They state "If resistance
to extinction is being tested, this wi thin-subject design is
inadequate. In this instance, the design does not control for
the effects of maturation, regression to the mean or extraneous
change-producing events" (p. 364). Other aspects of the environment
such as social approval may have changed concurrent with the intro-
duction of tokens. Staff attention, encouragement and contact with
the subjects will be greater under conditions of contingent
reinforcement (Mandelker, Brigham and Bushnell, 1970).
Approval and attention effects are confounded with reward
effects. The effect of instruction or other treatment such as
attention, which covaries with presentation and withdrawal, may
be controlling changes in behavior. Altering staff to these problems
and detailing changes in staff behavior cannot be expected to
remove these sources of contamination. The difficulty of providing
rewards in a social situation without also providing attention
compounds these methodological problems. Kazdin and Bootzin further
note the paucity of behavior modification research dealing with
complex behaviors such as social and language behaviors. This
latter criticism is shared by Rotter (1975) and Deci (1975). This
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paucity limits its applicability to such complex behaviors.
Davidson and Seidman (1974) review methodological problems
with the behavior modification literature dealing with delinquent
behavior, including 1) the failure to use multiple measures: "no
single measurement operation, behavioral observation included, is
inherently valid" (p. 100) (cf. Campbell and Fiske, 1959, on multi-
trait, multi-method paradigm), 2) failure to establish baseline
data, 3) failure to rule out maturation, i.e. change might have
occurred without the experimental manipulation. Davidson and Seidman
note that 82?^ of studies did not include no-treatment control
groups which would have ruled out such explanation. Rosenthal and
Rosnow (1969) outline issues relating to 4) the bias of data
collectors, and Davidson and Seidman note,
only one of the studies (of the published literature
from 1960 through June 1973 investigating methods of
behavior analysis applied to the modification of
delinquent behavior) used naive observers ... .many took
place in applied settings with a high premium on
successful outcomes, and that contemporary publication
practices demand successful results, (p. 1009)
Finally, Davidson and Seidman note that "a considerable portion
of the studies proposed demonstration of behavior and functional
relationships through reversal s. . .only 35% of the investigations
reported reversal data, generally considered necessary for demonstra-
tion of functional relationships" (p. 1005). A general criticism
of the behavior modification literature has to do with conceptual
confusion stemming from use of reversal data to indicate the
effectiveness of treatment on one hand, coupled with the observation
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that if the behavior in question reverses upon withdrawal of rein-
forcement, it precludes any claims to maintenance or generalization.
Reversal has been used to indicate both generalization or mainten-
ance (resistance to extinction) and efficacy of treatment (cf.
Kazdin criticism, 1973).
Levine and Fasnacht (1976) review other methodological problems
including 1) insufficient time to reject the extinction processes
(they cite six studies varying analysis of extinction effects
from ten minutes to two weeks and call for at least a month),
2) differential dropout rates (in Patterson, 1974 the dropouts
were more deviant than continuers. This would affect Patterson's
change in groups' -means creiterion), 3) regression artifacts
(Campbell and Stanley, 1963, p. 181) are uncontrolled as are
maturational effects in the following studies cited by Ford and
Foster (1976) as refuting Levine and Fasnacht's 1974 article:
Chadwick and Day, 1971; Jones and Kazdin, 1975; Kazdin and Polster,
1973; O'Leary et al., 1973; Davidson and Seidman, 1974; Phillips,
Phillips, Fixen, and Wolfe, 1971; Reisinger, 1972, and 4) confounding
effects of social reinforcers with token reinforcers. Levine and
Fasnacht (1976) state, "we consider these maintenance strategies
to be main treatments that can often replace TP's" (p. 91).
In summary, the behavior modification literature would be
unlikely to find negative consequences of reward procedures for the
following reasons: lack of follow-up; follow-up at incorrect times;
evaluation by biased observers; lack of control for regression and
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maturation artifacts; and the confounding of verbal and tangible
reward procedures. Also note that the reversibility of behavior
upon withdrawal of reward has been used to indicate effectiveness
of reward procedures and thus precludes claims to generalization
for the procedures.
Research related to perceived locus of causality
. A preponderence
of research reviewed for this paper suggests that behavioral
decrement following reward procedures occurs as a result of a
cognitive change. Recall that overjustification effects can be
conceptualized as instances where individuals react against a
perceived attempt at control of their behavior by others: "This
behavior is being rewarded by an external agent in addition to being
interesting in its own right. He is attempting to induce me (control)
to perform this behavior." This concept has been addressed by
writers other than those concerned with overjustification effects,
notably Brehm and Rotter.
One description of a cognitive change that is conceptually
similar to overjustification effects reviewed in this paper is
Brehm' s (1972) theory of psychological reactance. Brehm does not
address questions of behavioral decrement following reward. His
theory relates to an individual's tendency to react against
perceived loss of control of his environment. Rotter (1966) refers
to a belief by an individual in external or internal control.
External control refers to an individual's perception of rein-
forcement as unpredictable due to the complexity of forces around
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him, being under the control of others, or the result of luck,
fate, or chance. Internal control refers to an individual's
perception of the event as contingent upon his behavior or personal
characteristics: that he controls his own behavior.
Internal ity-external ity . The work of Rotter (1954, 1966) suggests
an individual difference variable relating to an individual's
perception of internal or external control of reinforcement.
Kazdin and Bootzin (1972) note that "almost all (behavior modifica-
tion) studies report that behavior of some subjects was not
altered" (p. 367), and suggest the possibility of individual
difference variables interacting with token procedures. Hilgard
and Bower (1966) state "The same objective situation may tap
appropriate motives for one learner and not another, as for example,
in the contrast between those motivated by affiliation and those
motivated by achievement" (p. 565).
Rotter developed the concept of internal versus external
control of reinforcement out of his social learning theory (Rotter,
1954; Rotter, Chance, and Phares, 1972) which attempts to integrate
cognitive and reinforcement theories of psychology. Rotter suggests
differences between individuals (though not traits) on this
external -i nternal dimension and that this variable is of major
significance in understanding the nature of learning processes in
different kinds of learning situations. (Rotter, 1966; 1975).
Rotters sees internal ity-external ity as learned and includes
seeing oneself under the control of others as promoting externality.
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To the extent that reward or reinforcement procedures are seen as
controlling, they will be promoting externality. Implications for
this promotion are great:
A series of studies provides strong support for the
hypothesis that the individual who has a strong belief
that he can control his own destiny is likely to a) be
more alert to those aspects of his environment which
provide useful information for his future behavior;
b) take steps to improve his environmental condition;
c) place greater value on skill or achievement rein-
* forcements and be generally more concerned with his
ability, particularly his failures; and d) be resistive
to subtle attempts to influence him. (Rotter, 1966
p. 25)
Rotter (1966) sees internal ity-external ity as a function of an
individual's reinforcement history. Phares (1957) found increments
and decrements following success and failure, respectively, to be
greater when subjects believed their performance was a result of
skill as opposed to chance factors, tending to support theories
portraying internal ity and externality as a function of an individual's
reinforcement history. Phares' (1957) work indicates that individuals
who achieve success regularly are more likely to be more internal
than if they had not been as successful, that an individual's
relative internal ity or externality will change as a function of
his relative success at manipulating his environment. Clinical
work suggests that an individual can, on the basis of cognitive
actions following a decision to do so, change his relative internality
in the form of his beliefs. (Lazarus and Fay, 1975; Ellis and
Harper, 1975; Ellis 1973).
Behavior is under interactive control, organism interacting
with environment (Bandura, 1975). Internality and externality tend
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to be self-sustaining and self-fulfilling. An individual believing
himself to be a pawn of fate will be less active, hence have less
control over his environment, thus ensuring that external forces
do have a relatively high determining rate for his behavior,
reinforcing his suspicions that he is a pawn of external forces.
Conversely, a relatively internal person, believing that he has a
determining role in his interaction with his environment, will be
relatively active, and thus affect his environment more than the
external individual, confirming his belief that he has an active
role.
Phares (1962) found that subjects perceiving their own control
of a situation, as opposed to subjects controlled by chance, etc.,
exhibited perceptual behavior better enabling them to cope with
potentially threatening situations. An individual who sees his
situation as chance-controlled learns less than if he were to
perceive it as based on his personal skill. Rotter (1966) states
that "when a subject perceives the tasks controlled by the experi-
menter, chance, or random conditions, past experience is relied
upon less. Consequently it may be said that he learns less... and
may indeed learn the wrong things (Skinner's superstitious behavior)"
(p. 8).
Strickland (1962) divided subjects into those aware and those
not aware of reinforcement contingency. Subjects who were aware
of their reinforcement contingency and did not condition were found
to be considerably more internal on Rotter's I-E scale than those
who were aware and did condition. Work by Getter (1962) supports
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Strickland s findings that internals tend to resist external
manipulation. Gore (1962) used a three-condi tion-of-experimenter-
influence variable (overt control, subtle control, no control) and
tested length of stories told subsequent to the control treatment.
Under the subtle control condition, internals told significantly
shorter stories than externals, while no differences were found in
overt and control conditions. The overt condition produced a
conscious choice on the part of the internals and hence produced
no resistance. Rotter (1966) calls the results of these studies
suggestive of a "kind of negativism to external manipulation on
the part of the internals" (p. 23).
Reactance . Brehm (1966, 1972) calls the same phenomenon psycho-
logical reactance. Brehm (1966) states "Given that a person has a
set of free behavior, he will experience reactance whenever any
of those behaviors is eliminated or threatened with elimination"
(p. 4). Brehm notes that when an individual is aware of reactance,
and, by implication, of an attempt at control, "he will feel an
increased amount of self-direction in regard to his own behavior...
he can do what he wants" (p. 9). Psychological reactance is defined
as "a motivational state directed toward the re-establishment of
the threatened or eliminated freedom... it should manifest itself
in increased desire to engage in the relevant behavior and actual
attempts to engage in it" (p. 15).
A logical extension of Brehm' s statements to the work described
in this paper would include the reluctance to engage in behavior
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prescribed by others. If the individual perceives the prescribing
as an attempt at control, elimination of that freedom occurs: "A
behavioral freedom may be eliminated by a person or organization
which has considerable power over one, employer-employee; parent-
child; guard-prisoner" (p. 38) and one might add teacher-student.
As preconditions for elimination of freedom by a social agent,
Brehm lists having power over someone, attempting to use the power
and surveillance of one's behavior by that social agent. Surveil-
lance or the imposition of deadlines can be seen as attempts at
control by a social agent. Lepper and his colleagues' work
documenting deleterious effects of surveillance and deadlines as
well as their work on reward would follow from Brehm's predictions.
Anecdotal evidence of psychological reactance involves Greene's
(1974) report of school children's refusal to participate in
token programs. Kazdin (1973) reviews refusal by adult psychiatric
patients and mentally retarded inpatients.
External validity . To substantiate claims that it is perceived
external control rather than the reward process per se that mediates
an inhibitory effect on behavior, one must establish that other
factors which control but are not rewarding have the same inhibitory
effect. Experiments by Lepper and his associates demonstrated
inhibitory effects for surveillance and for deadlines. An experiment
by Amabile, DeJong and Lepper (1976) investigated the effects of
two externally imposed deadlines, (implied and explicit) versus
two controls where subjects were asked to work as fast as possible
113
and to work at their own pace. Subjects in deadline conditions
were subsequently less interested in the target activity than
subjects in the control condition. Lepper et al
.
(1975) found that
adult surveillance will inhibit (decrease duration of) children's
play.
Self reinforcement
. Bandura (1971) and Bandura and Perloff (1967)
note two components in the process of self-reinforcement: 1) self-
selection of a standard of behavior and 2) contingent self-
administration of rewards. Work by Speidel (1972) and Bandura and
Perloff (1967) as well as classroom studies by Lovitt and Curtiss
(1969) and Glynn (1970) indicates that self-reward maintains behavior
as well as experimenter-determined reinforcement (Weiner and
Dubanoski, 1975). While self-administered reinforcement has not
been more effective than externally administered contingencies
(Kanfer, Homme, and Csanyi, 1970; Gonzales and Rechs, 1969; Johnson,
1969), self-developed contingencies seem to be more effective than
imposed contingencies (Lovitt and Curtiss, 1969).
Weiner and Dubanoski (1975) cite a study by Kanfer and Duerfeldt
(1967) finding self-reinforced subjects making more correct discrim-
inations during extinction than experimenter-controlled subjects.
They cite Johnson (1970), Johnson and Martin (1971) and Bolstad
and Johnson (1972) as finding greater resistance to extinction
among sel f-reinforced subjects at discrimination tasks. Weiner
and Dubanoski found that children permitted to select one of three
schedules of reinforcement for twenty contingently reinforced
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responses persisted longer and emitted more responses during
extinction than a group for whom schedule of reinforcement had been
selected by others.
Weiner and Dubanoski (1975) note that "recent research
regarding the acquisition of sel f-rei nforced responses (Bern, 1967;
Hartig and Kanfer, 1973; Kanfer and Marston, 1963; Meichenbaum and
Goodman, 1971; Kanfer, 1970) has demonstrated that self-control
mechanisms can be established experimentally by means of learning
procedures similar to those used for establishment of external
stimulus control" (p. 905), and that modelling procedures play an
important part in the transmission of patterns of self-reinforce-
ment (Bandura and Kupers, 1964; Hi 1 debrand t, Feldman and Ditrichs,
1973; McMains and Liebert, 1968; Mischel and Liebert, 1966).
Weiner and Dubanoski note that self-reinforcement can be transmitted
by training and modelling or both, and that consistency between
what is taught and what is modelled facilitates the adoption of
standards of reinforcement. 1
Lepper, Sagotsky, and Mailer (1975) found persistence of
effects (two weeks) after exposure to a model who reinforced him-
self at a game and generalization of those effects to a new game.
Lepper et al . note:
The common assumption underlying a great deal of current
applied research on self-reinforcement and self-regulatory
1 Note that overjustification research indicates possible
deferred negative consequences when using reward procedures to
facilitate behavior.
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processes (Bolstad and Johnson, 1972; Drabman et al
.
,
1973; Glynn, Thomas and Shee, 1973; Mahoney and Thoreson,
1974) is that treatment programs which successfully
alter a person's self-imposed contingencies will be
more likely than programs which alter a person's
immediate environment to produce generalization of
treatment effects beyond the particular situation in
which the program was initially instituted.
Research investigating modelling and self-reinforcement,
procedures minimizing the amount of subject's perceived external
control, appears to have promise for changing behavior without
undesired attendant effects. Attendant effects might include
fostering externality which has been associated with imposition of
control, poorer maintenance of behavior fostered, and undermining
of intrinsic interest in target or other behaviors.
Ramifications for the learning process . Ramifications of reward
procedures described in this paper seem greatest when studied in
relation to learning processes. Negative effects of rewards have
been alleged by various writers, and for a variety of reasons.
Feingold and Mahoney (1975) state:
Given the increasing use of token economy procedures
in educational settings, continuing research into the
possiblity of "undermining" effects is timely and highly
relevant. The existence of such research indicates an
ongoing evaluation and refinement of token economy
procedures. However, actual classroom practices have
received no such examination, and have benefited from
no such analogous refinement. Given the concomitant
de-emphasis of personal, social and educational factors,
it seems unlikely that all classroom token procedures
are free of negative effects, (p. 376)
Holt (1964) states, "we destroy ... the love of learning. .. in children
by. . .compel! ing them to work for petty and contemptible rewards--
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gold stars, or papers marked 100 attached to the wall, or A's on
report cards, or honor rolls, or dean's lists, or Phi Beta Kappa
keys" (p. 168). Bruner (1965) states: "learning that starts in
response to the rewards of parental or teacher approval or to
the avoidance of failure can too readily develop a pattern in which
the child is seeking cues as to how to conform to what is expected
of him" (p. 87). Bruner notes: "Much of the problem in leading
a child to effective cognitive activity is to free him from the
immediate control of environmental rewards and punishments" (p.
87). Deci (1975) states:
Children are intrinsically motivated to learn (Neill,
Leonard); the activities of learning and discovery are
rewarding in their own right because they allow a child
to feel competent in relation to his environment. The
use of rewards or punishments to encourage this learning
will only interfere with the learning, because it will
make the child's learning dependent on the reward and
cause him to do things that will lead him to the reward
in the easiest way. This will undoubtedly leave him
having learned less. (p. 212)
Winett and Winkler (1972), in an article assessing the effects
of behavior modification systems in the classroom, criticize our
educational system as one in which "there is a rigid preoccupation
with order and control and where children are required to be still,
to be silent, and to obey" (p. 499). Their review of behavior
modification literature indicates that too often behavior modifica-
tion procedures seek to perpetuate the status quo and that the
inappropriate behavior which behavior modifiers seek to change
"has been consistently defined as behavior that interferes with
order, quiet, and stillness" (p. 499). This description of behaviors
117
involves submission to control and, as such, is associated with
external ity.
The supposed end of education— devel opment of learning skills,
or cognitive capabi 1 i ties— i s operationally replaced with more
easily objectifiable factors loosely assumed to relate to those
gaols, such as attending behavior or sitting quietly. Winett and
Winkler (1972) call for an assessment of educational goals, and,
in fact, institutional goals, such as "goals for control for the
sake of control, order, and (misleading) tranquility" as opposed
to goals centered, for example, on removal of patients from
psychiatric hospitals (p. 501). O'Leary (1972) in an article
critiquing Winett and Winkler, supports Winett and Winkler's call
for a division of means from ends in behavior modification programs,
and suggests that more attention be given long-term goals of, for
example, the educational process. Davidson and Seidman (1974) in
a review of articles relating to behavior modification programs
involving deliquents, state:
the helping professions have been guilty of guiding
clients toward conformity and blaming those who do
not respond to their efforts... a new technology will
merely be used to attain old ends more effectively,
(i.e. control) and a generally damaging juvenile
system will continue unaffected (Gold & Williams,
1969; Jones, 1969). (p. 1009)
Thus we see that writers from varying backgrounds see control
supplanting learning as a goal in school and treatment settings.
On the basis of research by Rotter and perceived locus-of-causal i ty
writers one would expect an increase in individuals' belief in
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external control of their behavior. By using rewards to foster
learning or control, we are decreasing amount of time spent learning
while fostering a belief in external control of our behavior.
Implications for the present research can be stated succinctly:
The use of reward procedures when applied, at least, to high base
rate behaviors has a deleterious effect on subsequent duration of
that similar behavior. To the extent that learning is construed
as' a high base-rate behavior and subject to the same principles as
other high base-rate behaviors, rewards can be expected to have a
deleterious effect on the learning process. On the basis of this
research it appears that a reaction against perception of attempts
at external control of one's behavior through reward procedures is
responsible for this decrement.
Summary . This chapter reviews research related to the effects of
rewards on behavior, including its implications. Writers on
education indicate that curiosity seems to diminish as a result of
contact with the school system. Winett and Winkler (1972) studied
behavior modification procedures in schools and see them as being
used to control people for the sake of control as opposed to being
used to foster learning. Feingold and Mahoney (1975) alert us to
the possibility that discipline-relevant goals may interfere with
personal, social and educational considerations. Winett and Winkler
as well as Feingold and Mahoney call for an assessment of goals in
the behavior modification literature.
Behavior modifiers and other writers have studied and found a
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failure of learned behavior to generalize across time and settings
without specific maintenance strategies. These maintenance
strategies often involve verbal or attentional procedures which
Levine and Fasnacht (1975) see as main treatments as opposed to
maintenance strategies. A lack of demonstrable maintenance effects
in token research would tend to support predictions of generaliza-
tion of undermining effects.
Methodological problems with the behavior modification literature
prevent assessment as to whether potential usefulness of the
techniques outweighs negative consequences.
Kazdin and Bootzin (1972) review research and find that reward
procedures are not effective for some individuals. These findings
suggest an individual difference variable. Rotter reports that
individuals differ in their response to rewards on an internal ity-
externality continuum. Weiner (1970) has linked internals with
persistence in the face of failure, resistance to extinction (Weiner
and Dubanoski, 1975), and has found they self-reinforce better than
externals. In experiments conducted for this paper, persistence
at a task was diminished through the use of tangible reward.
Rotter (1966) calls internals resistant to subtle attempts at
control, making them more susceptible to undermining effects, i.e.
more likely to react against perceived loss of control.
Extrinsic rewards, to the extent that they are perceived by
an individual as being used to control his behavior, will cause a
cognitive process to take place which Brehm (1972) has called
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psychological reactance. An individual may perceive other factors
such as imposed deadlines and surveillance as well as extrinsic
rewards as attempts to control his behavior. Through generalization,
the individual will acquire a constellation of behaviors which Rotter
measures as externality.
Once a constellation, either external or internal, has been
learned, it tends to be self-perpetuating. It is assumed that
externality and internal ity are learned and can be unlearned, i.e.
increased or decreased. For example, self-reinforcement can be
taught while rewards may undermine internal ity. Research addressing
vicarious reinforcement and self-control processes was introduced
for its potential to avoid undermining effects. Antecedents of
internal ity-external ity merit investigation.
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df SV
1 SSa 3-1
.431 .431 16.58*
1 SSb 4-1
.050 .050 1.92
1 SSc 5-1
.118 .118 4.54*
1 SSab 6-3-4 + 1 .001 .001 .04
1 SSac 7-3-5 + 1 .011 .011 .42
1 SSbc 8-4-5 + 1 .025 .025 .96
1 SSabc 9-6-7 -8- +3+4 +5-1
.041 .041 1.58
32 SSw/cell 2-9
.832 .026
39 SStot 2-1 1.509
1 = G 2/ nqv = 6.284
2 = Ex 2 = 7.793
3 = XCAi 2 / . , = 6.715V
4 = EB^_ = 6.334
nr
5 = EC^_ = 6.402
nq
6 = Z[(AB1j)/Ril /r = 6.766
7 = £ [ ( ACi k 2 )mi
] ^
= 6.844
8 = e(BCjk ) 2 = 6.477
N
9 = z(ABCi j<) 2 = 6.961
Table 17: Least Squares ANOVA with proportional cell
frequencies
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1.5351 1.7645 3.2996
3.1962 3.4655 6.6617
4.7313 5.230 9.9613
. Y 2
l\ = 4.961
NJ
K % £ -X - - -
j
<2
= 5.527
y Y *2
j * = 4.974
IK
JK *
S£
.^l = 5.539
JKN % LLZXi
j
k 2 = 6.179
col 1 0 - 1 .013 .013 .325
row 1 K - 1 .566 .566 14.15
C X R 1 JK- J - K + l .000 .000 0
Error 16 JKN - JK .639 .040
Tot 19 JKN - 1 1.218
Table 18: ANOVA for Experiment 2
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° ~
- M 2 N = 14 N
21
25
8
17
19
19
65
19
29
3
22
34
38
29
X = 24.07
= 16
°diff .= /o * A 2“m i + m 230
17
45
40 = A.0Qy + 3.82 2
54
39
15
= 5.58936
18
68 T = Mj - M2
46
36 °diff
37
24 2.03
14
48
35.43
t . c 28 of = 2.048
.05
Table 19: t - test on males versus females in
experimental conditions pooled
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.0548 .1719 .4804 .4804 1.5351 1.7645 2.1962 2.4655
.0548 .0827 .4804 .4804
.3784 .0238 .4804 .4804
1.5351 1.7645 3.2996
.4138
.0548
.1146
.3674
.3674
.2609
.4804
.4804
3.1962 3.4655
4.7313 5.23
6.6617
9.9613
.9566 .7504 2.0695 2.402
'
Ex 2 = 6.1785
K % Ex ..<2
_
3.2996 2 + 6. 6617 2
.
IJ 10
I 'v, x. .
2
_
99
NJ
.227
20
4.961
JK ^ EE
. i k
2
_
cell tot
_
I 5
5. 539
J 'v EX
. j .
2
IK
4.7313 2
10
+ 5 . 23 2
. 4.974
JKN = 6.1785
(EEExi jK 2 )
SS MS F
col 1 .013 .013 .325
row 1 .566 .566 14.15
C X R 1 .000 0 0
Error 16 .639 .040
Tot 19 1.218
Table 20: ANOVA Experiment 2 with x/72
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